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Monetary policy transmission in emerging  
market economies: what is new? 
M S Mohanty and Philip Turner
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Introduction 
The emergence of a truly global market economy and the associated changes in monetary 
policy regimes worldwide have sharpened the debate about how monetary policy affects the 
economy. When the Deputy Governors met at the BIS to discuss this topic a decade ago, 
several economies were either recovering from a crisis or in the midst of one. Inflation rates 
were high and volatile, and fixed or semi-fixed exchange rates dominated monetary policy 
regimes in a number of countries. In addition, the domestic economies and financial systems 
of several countries were relatively closed to the outside world. Financial markets were 
comparatively underdeveloped. Hence transmission channels in emerging economies were 
different from those in industrial countries. Much uncertainty surrounded the impact of 
monetary policy on prices and output and the channels through which they occurred. The 
survey of monetary policy transmission by Kamin et al (1998) grew out of this meeting. 
Substantial changes over the past decade have doubtless altered transmission channels. 
Most, if not all, countries now have an independent monetary policy regime, with strong 
emphasis on inflation control. The financial markets in many countries are much more 
developed; the structure of the economy has undergone significant changes, and there has 
been a steady increase in trade and financial openness of emerging market economies. 
What do these developments mean for the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy? 
Have they reduced the degree of uncertainty concerning the impact of monetary policy? How 
have they influenced the response of the monetary authorities to various shocks? This paper 
seeks to update Kamin et al (1998), and draws extensively on the earlier paper. It discusses 
some of the new challenges facing monetary authorities in understanding the ways in which 
their policy instruments work through the economy.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 1 analyses the macroeconomic 
environment subject to which monetary policy is now conducted. Section 2 briefly reviews the 
major transmission channels for monetary policy and the extent to which their importance 
may have changed in the recent years. Based on a sample of emerging market economies, 
Section 3 provides some preliminary econometric evidence on whether the response of 
output and inflation to monetary policy shocks has changed between the early 1990s and 
2000s. Section 4 focuses on implications for the transmission mechanism of key changes in 
household, corporate and banking system balance sheets. The penultimate section looks at 
the issues concerning the impact of globalisation on monetary policy transmission. The final 
section concludes. 
                                                  
1   This paper is based on information provided by the central banks of emerging market economies. It has 
benefited from discussions with central bankers attending the December 2006 Deputy Governors’ Meeting 
and their subsequent comments. In addition, we are particularly grateful to Steven Kamin (an author of the 
1998 volume on transmission mechanisms) for extensive comments. Thanks are also due to Andrew Filardo, 
Már Gudmundsson, Serge Jeanneau, Dubravko Mihaljek, Ramon Moreno, Sweta Saxena, Agustin Villar, 
Bill White and Feng Zhu, for useful comments; to Magdalena Erdem, Clara García and Pablo García-Luna for 
excellent research assistance and to Marcela Valdez-Komatsudani for very competent secretarial help. 
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1. Monetary  and  macroeconomic  environment: what has changed? 
The monetary policy framework, the financial system in which the central bank operates and 
the real economy all condition monetary transmission mechanisms. The past decade has 
witnessed fundamental changes in each of these spheres. This section highlights some of 
the major policy changes with possible implications for the transmission mechanism. 
More credible monetary policy regimes 
One key change is in the growing focus of monetary policy on keeping inflation low, often 
(but not necessarily) in the context of formal inflation targeting. Targeting the exchange rate –
often the alternative policy framework – fell out of favour after several crises from the mid-
1990s demonstrated the increased vulnerabilities created by fixed exchange rate regimes. 
By 2005, some form of inflation targeting had become the most common monetary policy 
regime in emerging markets, with the number of fixed exchange rate and monetary targeting 



































MT = monetary targeting; IT = inflation targeting; ER= exchange rate targeting; IM= IMF program; OT= others.
1  Percentage of countries in the sample.




All major central banks in central Europe now conduct monetary policy through inflation 
targeting. Most do so in Latin America as well, although there are a few exceptions. Since 
the collapse of its dollar link in 2002, Argentina has been following monetary aggregates as 
an intermediate target for monetary policy. Since 2003, Venezuela has operated under a 
fixed exchange rate regime. In Asia, however, monetary policy regimes are much more 
mixed. Most crisis-hit economies switched to some sort of inflation targeting; but several 
nevertheless have a strongly managed exchange rate. China follows a quasi-fixed exchange 
rate regime and India has adopted a multiple indicator approach. Hong Kong SAR continues 
to operate under a currency board system and Singapore under an exchange rate (nominal 
effective rate) centred monetary policy regime. Among other countries, Israel, South Africa 
and Turkey have all adopted inflation targeting, while Saudi Arabia has a fixed exchange 
rate. 
This focus on inflation has been accompanied by a further switch towards a market-oriented 
monetary policy operating system, and away from quantitative instruments of monetary 
control. Most countries now conduct monetary policy through indirect instruments such as BIS Papers No 35  3
 
 
open market operations, discount rates and foreign exchange swaps (Table  1). Credit 
ceilings as a primary instrument of monetary control have ceased to exist in many countries, 
while only a few countries rely on reserve requirements or moral suasion for carrying out 
monetary policy operations. The operating systems in many countries are converging to that 
observed in industrial countries: the central bank sets a key short-term interest rate (the 
policy rate) and allows the market to determine other interest rates in the economy. 
 
Table 1 
Primary instruments of monetary policy 















suasion  Others 
Latin America               
Argentina   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes     
Chile     Yes  Yes  Yes     
Colombia       Yes  Yes     
Mexico             Yes
1 
Peru       Yes  Yes  Yes      
Venezuela   Yes    Yes       
Asia              
China   Yes    Yes    Yes   
Hong Kong SAR      Yes    Yes     
Indonesia   Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes   
Korea    Yes  Yes       
Malaysia       Yes
2  Yes
3     
Philippines   Yes    Yes       
Singapore         Yes
4    Yes
5 
Thailand       Yes  Yes     
Central Europe               
Czech Republic        Yes       
Hungary       Yes
6       
Poland   Yes    Yes      Yes
7 
Other EMEs               
Israel    Yes         
Saudi Arabia        Yes       
South Africa      Yes         
Turkey       Yes
8       
For footnotes, see the end of the table. 4  BIS Papers No 35
 
 
Table 1 (cont) 
Primary instruments of monetary policy 















suasion  Others 
Memo:              
United States    Yes  Yes  Yes       
Japan   Yes  Yes  Yes       
Euro area    Yes  Yes  Yes       
United Kingdom    Yes  Yes  Yes       
1  Floor for short-term interbank interest rate and a target for daily settlement balances (“corto”).    
2  Includes 
direct borrowing through open tender.    
3  Mainly to smooth ringgit movements.    
4  To target the S$ trade-
weighted exchange rate.    
5  Parameters: exchange rate bandwidth, slope of policy path.    
6  The MNB also 
uses reserve requirement, interest rate corridor and FX market operations, but these are not the primary 
instruments of monetary policy.    
7  Deposit facility; Lombard facility; and a corridor for o/n rates.    
8  Overnight 
money market rate and other open market operations. 
Source: National data (questionnaire). 
 
One implication of these changes is that a flexible exchange rate opens up an additional 
channel of monetary policy transmission. Second, if monetary policy regimes have become 
more credible, there could be major implications for the transmission of monetary shocks. 
Several recent studies have confirmed the beneficial effects of inflation targeting for inflation 
expectations: see Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001) and IMF (2006a).
2 Third, the shift to 
market-based monetary policy operations increases the role of the interest rate in the 
economy. 
How visible has the impact of the monetary regime change been on the transmission 
mechanism? Graph 2, which reports the views of central banks on the relative importance of 
various factors in the transmission mechanism, suggests that it has been important in 
virtually every economy. In Mexico, studies show that a major break in the transmission 
mechanism was associated with the introduction of inflation targeting in 2001.
3 Since then, 
inflation has tended to become stationary, the degree of inflation persistence has fallen, and 
inflation forecasts of various private sector agents have converged to the central bank’s 
inflation target. This appears to be true to varying degrees in several other countries as well 
(for instance, the Czech Republic, Colombia, Hungary and Poland). In Thailand, the switch 
from the fixed exchange rate regime to the managed float regime following the 1997–98 
crises has had important effects on the transmission mechanism. In Turkey, the amendment 
of the Central Bank Law in 2001, providing a clear mandate to the central bank to maintain 
                                                  
2   Levin et al (2004) empirically confirm this hypothesis in the industrial country context. Although their findings 
do not provide such evidence for emerging markets they argue that this may be related to the fact that inflation 
was already falling in several countries when they introduced the IT regime and that the post-IT period is too 
short to conduct robust empirical tests for these countries. 
3  See, for instance, González and González-Garcia (2006). BIS Papers No 35  5
 
 
price stability, and the recent disinflation have led to a significant reduction in the degree of 
































Most important         
Significantly important
Important              
1  Percentage of countries in the sample. Most important: score 1; significantly important: score 2 to 4; important: score 5 to 8.   2  "Others"
refers to external shocks, trade credits and banking sector development.
Source: National data (questionnaire).
Central banks’ views on the importance of changes in the policy environment
(percentage distribution)1 
 
Experience in various countries indeed suggests that such effects are not confined to 
changes in the policy framework, but also extend to other areas of monetary policy. For 
instance, the introduction in India of a new liquidity management framework in 2004 (the so-
called liquidity adjustment facility or LAF), setting a corridor for the movement of the daily 
interbank rate, has had significant implications for the transmission mechanism by improving 
the Reserve Bank of India’s control over the interest rate. In Chile, such a change is 
associated with the removal of the unremunerated reserve requirement on short-term capital 
inflows (the “encaje”), the switch to a nominal interest rate as the operating target for 
monetary policy, and a greater degree of monetary policy transparency in the context of 
inflation targeting. In Malaysia, the transition to an interest rate-oriented monetary operating 
system in 2004 has strengthened the response of financial market prices to monetary policy 
changes. In Singapore, improved public communication of the monetary authority’s 
exchange rate stance has affected the transmission mechanism by better stabilising private 
wage and price expectations. 
Changed macroeconomic environment 
The macroeconomic environment conditioning the conduct of monetary policy has also 
changed substantially over the past five years. As Table  2 shows, growth and inflation 
volatility has fallen in all regions (see Annex Table A1 for country details). The switch to a 
flexible exchange rate regime in many countries has limited the real overvaluations that often 
resulted when the exchange rate was used to stabilise inflation. Sudden currency crises have 
therefore become rare. Nevertheless, not all emerging market currencies have been fully 
flexible – several countries have witnessed an unprecedented and prolonged build-up of 
foreign currency reserves, particularly in Asia, during the past half decade. Indeed, the 
degree of exchange rate flexibility appears to have been much greater in Latin America and 








3   
1990–99 2000–Q206 1990–99 2000–Q206 
Latin America
4 6.1  4.4  847.4  4.1 
Asia
5 4.3  2.5  5.0  1.7 
China 1.8  1.3  8.2  1.6 
India 1.2  2.3  3.6  0.9 
Other Asia
6 5.0  2.7  4.8  1.8 
Central Europe
7 1.7  1.5  14.1  2.5 
Other emerging economies
8 4.5 3.1 64.2 6.8 
Total 4.5  3.0  264.2  3.5 
Memo:       
United States  1.5  1.3  1.1  0.8 
Euro area  1.2  1.1  1.1  0.2 
Japan 2.1  1.5  1.3  0.4 
1  Measured as standard deviation using quarterly data; regional aggregation as simple averages of national 
volatilities.    
2  Annual changes in real GDP.    
3  Annual changes in consumer prices.    
4  Argentina, Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.    
5  China, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.    
6  Asia as defined above but excluding China and India.    
7  The Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland.    
8  Israel, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Turkey. 
Source: National data. 
 
A second major constraint on monetary policy – fiscal dominance – also appears to have 
eased. Since the ratio of the fiscal deficit to GDP has fallen (or stabilised) in many countries 
over the past five years, the public debt ratio has stopped growing rapidly (Annex Table A2). 
Substantial progress in lowering deficits has been achieved in Peru, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, 
South Africa, Russia and Venezuela during this period (partly because of higher commodity 
prices, however). In contrast, several countries in central Europe have seen a re-emergence 
of significant fiscal problems. In a number of countries, fiscal reforms have reduced direct 
borrowing by the government from the central bank. In India, the end to automatic 
monetisation of the central government fiscal deficit has ushered in a new era of monetary 
policy since 1997. In Chile, the introduction of the structural budget surplus rule (1% of GDP) 
since 2001 has reduced fiscal policy-related output volatility, enhancing the role of monetary 
policy in demand management. Several other countries (Brazil, India and Peru to name a 
few) have introduced similar budgetary laws to limit fiscal dominance. 
Changes in the debt structure also affect transmission mechanisms. The reduced reliance on 
forex-denominated or forex-linked government debt has lowered the fiscal consequence of 
exchange rate changes. This has allowed governments to be more tolerant of such changes. 
Aktas et al (2007) point out that the fragile public debt structure of Turkey (dominated by 
short-term and inflation-indexed debt) in the past made the fiscal system very vulnerable to 
any tightening of monetary policy. The recent improvement in the fiscal situation has 







2 Financial  openness
3   
1990 2000 2005 1990 2000 2005
4 
Latin America
5 24.4  32.2  39.7  67.6  95.7  103.8 
Asia
6  40.9  61.9  80.7  72.1 111.4 126.2 
China    26.8  44.2 69.3 38.9 84.7 96.2 
India    16.4  28.8 44.3 30.2 42.3 57.8 
Other Asia
7  90.3  126.2 136.2 174.1 226.9 247.1 
Central Europe
8  49.4  93.2 101.4     113.5 134.2 
Other emerging economies
9  36.2  64.8  64.2     138.2 128.8 
Total  44.5  67.1  79.8     128.1 139.6 
Memo:            
United States   19.8  25.7  26.2  80.1 166.2 198.3 
Euro area  55.3  72.6  74.1     212.5  261.5 
Japan    20.5  21.3  28.1 111.4 100.4 154.4 
United  Kingdom  50.5  58.2  56.2 351.2 618.2 759.6 
1    Indicators shown expressed as a percentage of GDP; aggregated using 2000 GDP and PPP weights.    
2  Defined as the sum of imports and exports as a ratio to GDP.    
3  Measured as the sum of gross stocks of 
foreign assets and liabilities as a ratio to GDP.    
4  Data refer to 2004 for Mexico, India, Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Poland, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Turkey.    
5  Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.    
6  China, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.    
7  Asia as defined above but excluding China and India.    
8  The 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.    
9  Algeria, Israel, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Turkey. 
Sources: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006); IMF. 
 
These reforms have been accompanied by far-reaching changes to trade and capital account 
policies in many countries. Table 3 underlines the greater integration of emerging market 
economies with the global economy since the beginning of 2000 (see Annex Table A3 for 
country details). As discussed in a following section, such integration has several potential 
implications for monetary transmission.
4 
Reduced government intervention in the financial system 
Another important change has been the gradual reduction of government intervention in the 
financial system over the past decade. As discussed by Kamin et al (1998), government 
intervention in the past affected the monetary transmission process in at least three major 
ways: by imposing interest rate controls or other limits on financial market prices; by 
                                                  
4  In Israel, for instance, a major break point in the transmission mechanism for monetary policy has been 
associated with the liberalisation of capital flows in 1997, which sharply increased the response of the exchange 
rate to the interest rate and significantly shortened monetary policy lags; see Barnea and Djivre (2004). See also 
Eckstein and Soffer (2008). 8  BIS Papers No 35
 
 
imposing direct limits on bank lending; or by providing government-financed credit to 
selected areas.  
By 2005 interest rate controls had, by and large, been abolished in many countries. As 
Tables A4 and A5 in the Annex suggest, bank deposit and lending rates in most countries 
are now linked either directly to the policy rate or to a short-term market rate. In most 
countries, these rates are also negotiated with customers, implying some differentiation 
according to the latter’s size and creditworthiness. Nevertheless, some countries still control 
interest rates for certain categories of borrowers and amounts of transactions. For instance, 
Colombia and Poland maintain a ceiling on interest rates for all categories of loans; Malaysia 
and Thailand have a maximum rate for consumer loans; and India imposes a minimum 
interest rate for saving deposits and small loans. It is unclear how far these controls affect 
the transmission of monetary shocks. For instance, a maximum rate for bank lending may 
not be binding if it is set at a fairly high level. But, as the experience of the United States with 
“Regulation Q” demonstrated, a sharp tightening of monetary policy can aggravate output 
and inflation volatility by leading to significant disintermediation of the banking system, thus 
squeezing credit supply. A floor rate for deposits implies that the nominal interest rate cannot 
fall beyond a limit, reducing both the flexibility of monetary policy to address deflationary 
pressures and the transmission of policy shocks through interest rates. 
At the same time, several countries have significantly lowered cash reserve requirements for 
banks, which adversely affected their functioning and interfered with the development of 
financial markets. As Table A6 in the Annex shows, the typical cash reserve requirement in 
emerging markets is between 2 and 6%, which is still high relative to that seen in some 
industrial countries. Several countries (Argentina, Chile, China, Indonesia, the Philippines 
and Venezuela) impose reserve requirements in excess of 8%, although in some cases they 
may apply only to certain selected types of liabilities. Central banks in a number of countries 
do not pay interest on cash reserve requirements, and many pay interest at below market 
rates.  
The picture varies with regard to liquidity requirements, which prescribe mandatory bank 
holdings of part of their liabilities in government securities or other such liquid assets. There 
is some evidence that such requirements have not fallen (and have even gone up in some 
countries) over the past decade (Annex Table A7). How far these requirements may be 
binding on banks’ investment activities remains unclear. Given their attractive returns, banks 
in some countries (for instance, India) have invested in government securities beyond the 
prescribed minimum ratio. In other countries (for instance, Singapore), such a requirement is 
essentially a prudential, rather than a monetary regulation. To the extent that interest rates 
on government securities are market-determined, such requirements may not adversely 
affect banks’ profitability but may have significant implications for trading volumes and 
market liquidity.  
With the exception of a few countries, aggregate credit controls on banks have been 
abolished. China maintains monetary controls through the “window guidance” route, requiring 
banks to restrict credit expansion in certain sectors (for instance, real estate) and support 
development programmes. However, reliance on such controls is declining with the recent 
measures to liberalise interest rates in the economy (particularly the removal of a ceiling for 
the lending rate and a floor for the deposit rate). India has a minimum lending requirement for 
certain priority sectors. Prudential guidelines that would effectively restrict credit to certain 
sectors have been set in several countries. However, these are not explicitly used for 
monetary policy purposes.  
Growth of financial markets 
The past decade has also seen considerable development of financial markets in emerging 
market economies. The health of the banking system has improved substantially in all 
regions (Annex Table A8), and this has meant that the transmission of lower policy rates has BIS Papers No 35  9
 
 
improved (in the late 1990s, by contrast, weak banking systems compromised the 
transmission of easier policies). Apart from enhancing its resilience to monetary policy 
shocks, there is evidence that a healthy and competitive banking system reduces 
intermediation spreads. It also leads to a more symmetrical (and arguably more predictable) 
response of bank interest rates to higher and lower policy rates.
5 
More importantly, and in contrast to the experience of the 1990s, money and bond markets in 
several countries have deepened. One indicator of increasing money market depth is the 
growing daily turnover in relation to the banking system’s total assets (Annex Table A9). In a 
number of countries, this has been led by growing use of repurchase operations in central 
banks’ monetary operations. In Argentina, the central bank has been developing a market for 
its notes and bonds in order to develop a benchmark interest rate in the interbank market. In 
India, such a trend has been led by a substantial migration of money market activity from the 
uncollateralised call market to the collateralised repo market, paving the way for the 
development of a short-term money market. However, the interbank repo market continues 
to be underdeveloped in a number of countries, limiting the development of a robust term 
money market. Similarly, money market derivatives such as interest rate swaps, an important 
component of market liquidity, are absent in a number of countries. 
Table A10 in the Annex provides indicators of liquidity in the domestic bond market. This 
influences the monetary transmission mechanism because it makes the yield curve more 
sensitive to changes in the policy rate and reduces sharp, unwarranted volatility in financial 
asset prices. In several countries, there is evidence to suggest that bond markets have 
grown in size and that maturities have lengthened over the past five years. Typical bid-ask 
spreads have fallen, and attempts have been made to increase maturity at issue to develop 
long-term benchmarks. Nevertheless, turnover ratios in many countries continue to be low 
compared to those in mature markets. In countries where turnover ratios are relatively large, 
they tend to reflect low outstanding stocks, rather than a significant increase in transaction 
volumes. 
Reflecting financial market growth, the sources of financing of the private non-financial sector 
have broadened over the past decade (Annex Table A11). The share of commercial bank 
lending in total financing has fallen in many countries – in some cases (for instance, 
Hungary, Malaysia, Mexico and Thailand) quite sharply – between 1993 and 2005. This also 
remains true of the state-owned development financial institutions, which in the past played 
an important role in the financing of long-term capital projects. By 2005, the share of equity 
and bond financing was tending to rise. Another development has been a strong increase in 
financing through international capital markets, which constituted 20–40% of total private 
non-financial sector financing in many countries in 2005. 
2.  Major transmission channels 
Among the various channels through which monetary policy can affect demand, five have 
been generally highlighted in the literature: short-term interest rates; long-term interest rates 
and asset prices; the exchange rate; the credit channel; and the expectations channel: see 
Mishkin (1995). This section extends and updates the analysis prepared by Kamin et al (1998) 
and examines whether the relative importance of various channels has changed over the 
past decade. 
                                                  
5   See, for instance, Archer (2006) and Mohanty et al (2006) and the studies reviewed therein. 10  BIS Papers No 35
 
 
The interest rate channel 
In most conventional models of monetary transmission, a change in the policy rate under the 
central bank’s control spreads to bank lending and deposit interest rates, which directly 
affects business and household spending decisions. 
As the marginal interest rate (ie that on new borrowing) changes, business and household 
spending decisions are affected. For this, the real rate is important: a rise in the nominal 
interest rate that reflects higher inflation expectations – so that the real rate remains 
constant – will not change the perceived marginal cost of borrowing. The impact on existing 
loan contracts (ie “old” borrowing) will depend on the terms of the contracts. With floating rate 
contracts, average rates will change in line with marginal rates. With fixed rate contracts, 
average rates change more slowly over time as old contracts come up for renegotiation. 
Such an effect is important because it will alter the cash flow and balance sheet positions of 
borrowers as it changes the average interest rate. Hence household and business spending 
responses to a given change in policy rate will depend on the nature of loan contracts and 
the degree of indebtedness (Section 4 expands this analysis further). 
In industrial countries the interest rate channel generally plays an important role in the 
transmission of monetary shocks. For instance, according to research done by the European 
Central Bank (2002), direct and indirect effects of interest rate changes (including wealth and 
exchange rate effects) on investment explain about 80% of the total response of output to 
monetary shocks after a lag of three years. In emerging markets, during the 1980s and 
1990s there were several impediments to the operation of the interest rate channel. The lack 
of well developed money and bond markets and frequent shifts in the risk premium are 
examples of such impediments. In some cases, binding interest rate controls combined with 
non-price mechanisms for allocating credit reduced the pass-through of the policy rate to 
other interest rates. This may have also reduced the macroeconomic effects of policy rate 
changes. A greater dependence of firms on the internal cash surplus for financing capital 
projects lowered the response of investment to interest rate changes. Limited possibilities for 
household borrowing restricted the impact of interest rate changes on households as well. As 
noted above, several of these constraints have eased over the past decade.  
Has interest rate pass-through changed recently? While this issue is examined in detail by 
Moreno (2008), Table 4 summarises central banks’ views about the relative strength of the 
pass-through of policy rates based on internal research. Several findings emerge from the 
table. First, in a majority of countries, pass-through is generally found to be stronger and 
longer-lasting for bank deposit and lending rates than for the bond rate. Second, long-term 
bond rates now react significantly to the policy rate, although the impact is seen as 
temporary in several cases (discussed below). Third, in economies with large external 
financing requirements – in particular Latin America – monetary policy easing may influence 
the inflation risk premium on local currency debt and even perhaps the country risk premium. 
If a lower policy rate is regarded as unsustainable or raises future inflation expectations, then 
market-determined rates further along the maturity spectrum may not fall and could even 
rise, sometimes sharply if the currency comes under pressure. As noted above, this has 
been a major dynamic in countries with weak fiscal positions and a history of high inflation. 
Because the credibility of fiscal and monetary policy has now improved in many crisis-prone 
countries and because of current account surpluses, this “perverse” dynamic has changed: 




Response of long-term interest rates to policy rates 























Latin America                   
Argentina      Yes      Yes    Yes   
Chile    L    L          Yes 
Colombia    T      L      T  L 
Mexico    Yes      Yes        Yes 
Peru    L    L          Yes 
Venezuela      Yes    Yes        Yes 
Asia                   
Hong Kong SAR
1    L      L        T 
India    Yes      Yes         
Indonesia  Yes          Yes    Yes   
Korea    Yes    Yes          Yes 
Malaysia  L      L        T   
Philippines    Yes               
Thailand    T      L         
Central Europe                   
Czech Republic    T
2    L
3          Yes 
Hungary  Yes
4      L
5          Yes 
Poland      T            T 
Other EMEs                   
Israel  L
6        Yes        Yes
7 
Saudi Arabia      Yes    Yes        Yes 
South Africa    Yes    L          Yes 
Turkey  Yes        Yes      Yes   
L = Long-lasting; T = Temporary. 
1    Policy rate movements refer to changes in US federal funds target rate.    
2  Depends  on  market 
expectations.    
3  Stronger on short-term rates, depends on market expectations.    
4  Immediate.    
5  Takes a 
few months but persistent.    
6  Impact occurs during the following one-two months and remains persistent.   
7  Generally insignificant, depends on the size of the policy rate change. 
Source: National data (questionnaire). 
Table 5 shows that most central banks see interest rates as the dominant channel of 
transmission. For instance, in Mexico, while shocks to the exchange rate explained over 60% 
of changes in inflation during the 1990s, the share had fallen to 16% by early 2000. In 




6 In Argentina, during the high inflation years of the 1980s, nominal interest 
rates were largely determined by inflation expectations. Higher interest rates were often 
associated with a rise rather than a decline in inflation and the rate of nominal currency 
depreciation. In contrast, with inflation becoming more moderate since the early 1990s (aside 
from the spike when the exchange rate collapsed), interest rates now have a strong and 




Most dominant channels of monetary policy transmission: 
central bank views 
Latin America   
Argentina  Interest rates, money growth and nominal exchange rate innovations (under 
an environment of low inflation). 
Chile  Direct interest rate, exchange rate, credit and expectations channel. 
Colombia  Expectations, cost push, aggregate demand and exchange rate channel. 
Mexico  Nominal interest rate. 
Asia  
China  Mainly credit channel.  
Hong Kong SAR  Direct cost of capital effect.  
India  Money growth, interest rate and credit channel. 
Malaysia  Credit, interest rate, exchange rate and asset price channel. 
Philippines  Base money, interest rate and exchange rate channel.  
Singapore  Exchange rate channel. 
Thailand  Interest rate, exchange rate and asset price channel. 
Central Europe   
Czech Republic  Interest rate and exchange rate channel.  
Hungary  Exchange rate channel. 
Poland  Interest rate and exchange rate channel. 
Other emerging 
economies   
Israel  Exchange rate channel. 
South Africa  Interest rate and exchange rate channel.  
Turkey  Exchange rate, interest rate, expectations and risk premium channel. 
Source: National data (questionnaire). 
 
                                                  
6   See González and González-García (2006). 
7   See Basco et al (2006). BIS Papers No 35  13
 
 
There is also evidence of the interest rate channel in several Asian economies having gained 
importance. This is particularly true of Thailand in the aftermath of the 1997–98 crises.
8 In 
Hong Kong SAR, as the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (2008) discusses in this volume, 
given its strong impact on consumption and fixed investment, the direct cost channel 
constitutes the most important channel for the transmission of monetary shocks from the 
United States (given the currency’s link with the US dollar). In the Philippines, although 
monetary policy has a direct impact on inflation in the short run through base money, in the 
long run, it is the central bank borrowing rate which dominates the transmission channel. 
The role of the interest rate channel has also increased in central and eastern Europe, 
although its relative importance varies across countries. For instance, in the Czech Republic 
and Poland, this rise has been accompanied by an increase in pass-through of the central 
bank policy rate to bank deposit and lending rates, and in Hungary by larger and more rapid 
changes in bond rates. The future adoption of the euro would presumably strengthen this 
trend. To the extent that a single currency will contribute to reducing money market volatility 
and further deepening the domestic bond market in the region, it will help increase the role of 
the interest rate in the transmission of euro area monetary policy shocks. 
Long-term interest rates or the asset price channel 
A major change since the mid-1990s is the development of market-determined long-term 
interest rates in many countries as bond markets have developed. This is discussed further 
by Moreno (2008) in this volume. Changes in growth and inflation expectations determine the 
long-term rate of interest. Monetary policy reactions to shocks that keep such expectations 
constant (eg higher policy rates to counter an incipient rise in inflation expectations) may thus 
have no visible impact on long-term rates. Unanticipated changes in monetary policy, 
however, will lead to changes in long-term rates. One important complication is the behaviour 
of term premia. It is difficult to interpret the sensitivity of long-term interest rates to monetary 
policy changes when term premia are also changing. This has important implications for the 
interpretation of changes in the shape of the yield curve. 
The present value of any asset or durable good is inversely related to the real long-term 
interest rate and positively related to the earnings of the asset. Hence, for example, equity 
prices can be interpreted as reflecting the discounted present value of expected future 
enterprise earnings. It follows from this that the causality between asset prices and 
macroeconomic performance runs in both directions. Expectations of stronger growth raise 
expectations of future earnings and, possibly, equity prices. This two-way causality makes it 
difficult in practice to discern the true impact of asset prices on aggregate demand. 
There are two major routes through which higher asset prices can increase demand. First, 
higher asset prices boost household wealth; if this is regarded as permanent, desired 
consumption will increase.
9 In addition, increased wealth can be used as collateral to allow 
intertemporal substitution. Second, higher asset prices raise the market value of firms in 
relation to the replacement cost of capital (the so-called Tobin’s q), increasing the 
attractiveness of new residential and non-residential investment projects. 
There is some evidence to suggest that private consumption has been positively associated 
with asset prices (Graph 3). House prices tend to be correlated with interest rates. In 
contrast, equity prices tend to be correlated with several variables only weakly related to 
monetary policy. Even so, there are still several mechanisms through which monetary policy 
                                                  
8   See Disyatat and Vongsinsirikul (2002). 
9   White (2006) argues that, in a closed economy, an increase in house prices may not imply an increase in 
wealth for the country as a whole, since they are likely to be offset by the expected future cost of living in a 
house. 14  BIS Papers No 35
 
 
could influence equity prices. First, lower interest rates reduce the discount factor for future 
dividend income, raising their present value. Second, to the extent that they raise 
expectations of future growth, lower interest rates may increase expected future cash flows 
and stock returns. Third, as pointed out by Bernanke and Kuttner (2003), an easy monetary 
policy may give rise to “expected excess return” by reducing the riskiness of stocks (for 
instance, by improving the balance sheet position of firms) as well as increasing investors’ 
willingness to bear risk (for instance, by increasing expected future income).
10 
A major question is the extent to which the increased diversity of household wealth portfolios 
has enhanced the potential importance of asset prices for household consumption. Growing 
home ownership in many countries in recent years has been associated with a rise in the share 
of residential property in household wealth (for instance, over 60% in the Philippines and 
Colombia). This should, in principle, increase the sensitivity of consumption to policy-induced 
changes in property prices. In contrast, equities still constitute only a small part of household 
wealth in most emerging markets (for instance, between 1 and 2% in Colombia and India). In 
countries with a relatively diversified portfolio, such as Singapore, equities and residential 














































AR = Argentina; BR = Brazil;  CL = Chile; CN = China; CO = Colombia; HK = Hong Kong SAR; ID = Indonesia; IN = India; KR = Korea;
MX = Mexico; MY = Malaysia; PE = Peru; PH = Philippines; SA = Saudi Arabia; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand; TR = Turkey;
TW = Taiwan (China); ZA = South Africa. 
1 Average of annual changes 2002-05, in per cent; in real terms.   2 Deflated by consumer prices. 

























































Equity prices2 Property prices2 
Asset prices and consumption1 
 
Much depends on the degree of financial development and thus whether households are 
able to withdraw a part of their housing and equity wealth for consumption: see Mishkin (2007). 
This has been a major factor in many industrial countries in the current cycle, where 
households have borrowed against such collateral not only to finance higher consumption 
but also to invest in new residential property. In many emerging markets, however, banks 
might not be willing to lend even against collateral already in their possession. The 
                                                  
10  In the context of the United States, Bernanke and Kuttner (2003) show that a 25 basis point surprise reduction 
in the Fed rate on average is associated with a 1 per cent increase in stock return (CRSP value-weighted 
index). This is similar to findings obtained in other studies; see, for instance, Rigobon and Sack (2002). BIS Papers No 35  15
 
 
underdevelopment of the mortgage-backed securities market could also limit the financing of 
such expenditure via the market. In Mexico, for instance, the lack of a proper refinancing 
mechanism has been a major factor restricting households’ ability to borrow against their 
assets. In the Philippines, the rental market provides partial compensation for a similar 
bottleneck as house owners are able to monetise part of their housing wealth by adjusting 
rents. 
Has the role of the asset price channel changed in emerging market economies? This 
channel seems to have played a greater role in Asia than other regions in the current cycle. 
In China, for instance, strong property prices have been associated with higher bank lending 
since early 2005. House price inflation has in turn boosted household spending on a wider 
variety of durable consumption goods. The paper from Hong Kong SAR for this meeting 
draws attention to the differential impact of property prices on inflation and output: see 
Hong Kong Monetary Authority (2008). It shows that interest rate shocks operating through 
property prices have a much stronger impact on consumer prices than on household wealth 
and consumption. This is because rent is a much larger component in the overall price index 
in Hong Kong than it is in other economies. Nevertheless, a large decline in property prices 
over a short period can produce significant negative effects on consumption. This was 
demonstrated by a prolonged period of deflation in Hong Kong following the bursting of the 
property market bubble in 1997. 
There is some evidence to suggest that the sensitivity of asset prices to interest rates may 
have changed, especially in South East Asia, following the 1997–98 crises. In Korea, while 
house prices are historically sensitive to changes in monetary conditions – in particular, bank 
lending – this relationship has strengthened further since the crises.
11 In Singapore, while 
interest rate induced property market cycles have played a significant role in the 
consumption cycle, the same does not hold for equity prices.
12 In contrast, in Thailand 
interest rates have had a much stronger influence on equity prices than on property prices in 
the post-Asian crisis period.
13 In Saudi Arabia a large increase in oil revenues over the past 
few years has been associated with a “liquidity boom” and a shift in investors’ preference 
towards domestic assets: see Al-Jasser and Banafe (2008). This has led to sharp increases 
in equity and residential property prices and a consumption boom. 
The exchange rate channel 
In open economies, monetary policy operates to a considerable extent through the exchange 
rate. A key assumption underpinning this relationship is the uncovered interest rate parity 
condition (UIP): when the exchange rate is floating, a policy-led cut in the interest rate leads 
to capital outflows and a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate.
14 With sticky prices, this 
leads to a real depreciation and an increase in the price of tradables relative to 
non-tradables. The exchange rate channel plays an important role in emerging market 
economies for several reasons. First, the influence of the exchange rate on demand in small 
open economies tends to be large. Second, the exchange rate often constitutes a key 
variable for private sector expectations about inflation. Third, exchange rate changes 
produce large balance sheet effects in those economies where households and firms have 
foreign currency assets and liabilities. 
                                                  
11  See Park (2006). 
12  According to the internal estimates of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, a dollar decrease in the main 
equity price index leads to a fall of 2 cents in private consumption. 
13   See Sriphayak and Vongsinsirikul (2006). 
14  More strictly, UIP implies that the exchange rate must fall enough to generate expectations of a subsequent 
appreciation equal to the new interest rate differential. 16  BIS Papers No 35
 
 
Singapore – an open economy par excellence – actually uses the nominal effective 
exchange rate as its intermediate target for monetary policy. In such an open economy, 
output and inflation are highly sensitive to changes in the exchange rate.
15 There is a similar 
adjustment mechanism in Israel, where the exchange rate appears to dominate other 
transmission channels.
16 
The importance of the exchange rate channel may also depend on the share of domestic 
value added (compared with imported goods/services) in tradables. If this is high, exchange 
rate changes have a large effect on output and on demand. But if import content is very high, 
then the exchange rate will have a more limited impact on domestic product, and a large 
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How far has the relationship between the interest rate and the exchange rate changed in 
recent years? Lower and more stable risk premia (eg as a result of the better 
macroeconomic environment) may have made the exchange rate response to domestic   
                                                  
15  Research shows that the transmission of monetary shocks is relatively weak through the interest rate, which 
plays only a minor role in output and inflation development; see Chow (2005). 
16  See Barnea and Djivre (2004). See Eckstein and Soffer (2008) 
17   A special case in which devaluations can be contractionary has sometimes been put forward in the analyses 
of emerging market economies. This case arises when the debt of households, government or corporations is 
denominated in foreign currency and owed to non-residents: in such a case, a rise in the domestic currency 
value of debt following devaluation may offset the effect of expenditure-switching to domestically produced 
goods. This was frequently argued to be the case in Latin America during the 1980s – because of extreme 
currency mismatches in balance sheets. 
  Kim (2005) argues that in Korea a real depreciation has a negative impact on profitability and investment 
(through increased debt service payments as well as import costs). Sarikaya et al (2005) report a similar 
finding in Turkey. The 1997–98 Asian financial crises brought to light a similar problem for countries where 
firms and banks had borrowed heavily in foreign currency. As foreign currency debt declines, of course, these 
contractionary impulses are reduced. This devaluation-as-contractionary theory has often been used to resist 
necessary exchange rate adjustment (“fear of floating”); it is important to be clear on its limitations. Because 
bygones are bygones, inherited debt structures should not influence current production decisions: a 
devaluation therefore unambiguously makes domestically produced goods more competitive with foreign 
goods in an opportunity cost sense. BIS Papers No 35  17
 
 
interest rates more predictable. In Hungary, for instance, volatile risk premia during the 
1990s weakened the response of the exchange rate to monetary policy shocks. But studies 
covering a more recent period report that an unexpected 25 basis point increase in the policy 
rate results in an immediate exchange rate appreciation of 0.5–1%.
18 
In principle, the increased share of foreign goods and services in emerging markets should 
have made the exchange rate channel more potent. There is, however, econometric 
evidence that the pass-through for exchange rates to domestic prices appears to have 
declined in many emerging market economies: see Mihaljek and Klau (2008). One reason for 
this is that the “signal” value of the exchange rate for inflation has declined as confidence has 
grown in the efficacy of domestic policy frameworks in controlling inflation. 
Finally, a new complication in exchange rate dynamics in many countries might be noted. 
This is the greater importance of medium-term changes in the terms of trade. During the 
1990s, the terms of trade between raw material and manufactured goods showed no obvious 
trend (Graph 4). Beginning around mid-2003, however, oil prices rose. Then the prices of 
non-fuel commodities began to rise. Most recently, wheat prices have surged. At first, it was 
not clear whether these developments reflected market-specific factors and were purely 
temporary. However, it now appears that these relative price shifts are rather long-lasting. 
Such shifts make it very hard for the central bank to “read” the exchange rate, and to decide 
how far (if at all) it would be wise to use monetary policy to offset or to spread over time the 
effects of exchange rate changes. The real long-term equilibrium exchange rate may well 
have risen in the commodity-exporting countries as commodity prices reach a new medium-
term level. If so, this represents a real change that monetary policy should not seek to offset. 
Many would indeed argue that monetary policy cannot offset the real exchange rate in the 
long run – attempting to do so would eventually cause real appreciation via higher inflation. 
Exactly comparable arguments apply in the case of rapidly developing countries whose 
underlying capacity to produce tradables has expanded. In both cases, appreciation 
pressures are accentuated by capital inflows.  
In practice, however, central banks have considerable room to manoeuvre in the short run. 
Policy decisions will be all the harder because it will not be clear how far the equilibrium 
exchange rate has risen. Nor will it be obvious how far a gradual – rather than abrupt – 
movement to a new equilibrium will reduce adjustment costs. Central banks will need to look 
very closely at the determinants as well as the size of exchange rate movements when 
setting interest rates. 
The credit channel 
A separate credit channel exists when banks ration credit through non-pricing mechanisms, 
so that the terms on which credit is available include variables additional to the interest rate. 
The credit channel has been particularly important in the emerging market context, where 
credit controls and directed credit programmes have limited firms’ and households’ access to 
the credit market. Such constraints have often been tightened during periods of monetary 
restriction.  
Even in the absence of such restrictions, it has long been known that a tightening of 
monetary policy can generate a negative credit supply response (in addition to a demand-led 
contraction). Banks tend to respond to monetary tightening by cutting the supply of loans to 
small borrowers (the so-called bank lending channel) and raising the spread charged to 
them.
19 To the extent that banks hold limited equity, their lending capacity might be further 
                                                  
18  See, for instance, Vonnák (2006). 
19  Evidence in both developed and emerging markets shows that banks do face resource constraints (to the 
extent that they cannot replace lost deposits with market borrowing) because they might be subject to 
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impaired in the face of a binding capital-to-asset ratio due to a rise in non-performing loans.
20 
In addition, banks’ credit supply could be affected through a deterioration in borrowers’ net 
worth and a decline in collateral values (the balance sheet channel).
21 
As noted above, the past decade has seen major developments in credit markets. Financial 
systems in most countries have been substantially deregulated and the health of the banking 
system and the regulatory environment has improved. How might these developments 
influence the credit channel? 
 
Table 6 
Investment response to bank credit from a panel regression: 2000–05 





2  DW  Bank 
credit  R
2  DW 
Asia
2   0.14   0.29   2.33   0.25**   0.63   1.94 
   (0.90)       (2.20)     
Latin America
3   0.70***  0.40   2.01   0.65***  0.60   2.42 
   (2.96)       (2.69)     
Others
4   0.44*   0.33   2.15   0.40   0.45   1.81 
   (2.00)       (1.47)     
All emerging markets    0.49***    0.32   2.14   0.43***  0.48   2.03 
   (3.82)       (3.72)     
*, **, *** denote coefficients significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively; 
t-statistics are given in parentheses. 
1  The panel for the control specification is: 
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where “Δ” is the first difference operator, “bc” is real bank credit deflated by consumer prices, “π” is consumer 
price inflation, “inv” is gross fixed capital formation in real terms, “i” is the nominal bank lending rate, and “xp” is 
the volume of exports. All panels include cross-section fixed effects.    
2    China, Hong Kong SAR, India, 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan (China) and Thailand.    
3  Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.    
4  The Czech Republic, Hungary, Israel, Poland, Russia, 
Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Turkey. 
Source: BIS estimates. 
 
Table 6 shows the estimated response of fixed investment to bank credit from a panel 
regression focusing on the first half of this decade. A main finding emerging from the table is 
that bank credit appears to have a significant influence on investment in emerging market 
economies. This finding does not change even after controlling for several demand factors 
(such as output, exports and the real interest rate), suggesting that the supply of bank credit 
does play a role in influencing fluctuations in investment spending (nevertheless, it should be 
                                                                                                                                                      
asymmetric information problems, and tighter monetary policy reduces their profitability; see Kashyap and 
Stein (2000) and Bean et al (2002). 
20  See Van den Heuvel (2002) for the role of bank capital in monetary policy transmission. 
21  See Bernanke and Gertler (1995). BIS Papers No 35  19
 
 
borne in mind that reverse causation – investing firms becoming keener to take out loans – 
could bias the coefficients in this regression). Another important finding is that the relative 
impact of bank credit on investment varies across regions: the impact is stronger in Latin 
America and central and eastern Europe than in Asia. 
Country experiences of the importance of the credit channel are mixed. In several countries, 
a prolonged period of easy monetary policy over the past few years may have reduced the 
influence of this channel. In Poland, for instance, there appears to have been some 
weakening of the credit channel as banks have built up a large “liquidity buffer”. Such a 
buffer can shield banks from a tightening of monetary policy.
22 While a credit channel was 
operative in the Czech Republic during 1996–98, evidence of its existence is weak during the 
early 2000s. Yet some studies show that there may be a distributive effect of monetary policy 
in the sense that banks with higher levels of non-performing loans respond less positively to 
a cut in the interest rate.
23 
In Asia, a sharp decline in bank credit in the aftermath of the 1997–98 financial crises has 
been followed by a revival since the early 2000s. In several countries the degree of credit 
market imperfection appears to be declining. In the Philippines, while the development of a 
commercial paper market and greater use of loan commitments (fixed credit lines for 
discretionary use by firms) have reduced some of the effects associated with a tighter 
monetary policy, a relatively high non-performing loan ratio in the banking system has had an 
opposite effect. In Thailand, studies show a significant decline in the output and inflation 
response to bank credit, particularly following the 1997–98 financial crises, which has led to 
increased financial diversification. This also remains true in Singapore, where small and 
medium-sized enterprises are increasingly accessing the equity and bond markets for their 
financing needs. 
In the two large Asian economies, however, bank credit is still central. In China, given the 
quantitative orientation of its monetary policy and significant credit controls, monetary policy 
primarily affects demand by changing the supply of credit. In India, recent research has 
shown that small banks tend to curtail credit supply more sharply than big banks during 
monetary tightening.
24 
In Latin America, the recent surge in lending has relieved the earlier fears of credit 
constraints. Investment and credit have been positively related in most countries in the 
current cycle. In Colombia, although the credit channel remains important, its role has been 
reduced in recent years as firms have increasingly relied on internal revenue for financing 
capital projects. At the same time, credit flow to small firms and households has improved 
substantially. The 1995 financial crisis had a widespread impact on the credit market in 
Mexico, with banks actively rationing credit. However, during the past few years, bank credit 
to the private sector has grown at a rapid rate. 
The expectations channel 
Although not a stand-alone channel, expectations have considerable significance for the 
effectiveness of all other channels of transmission. To the extent that private sector wage 
and price expectations are forward-looking, they can speed up the adjustment of nominal 
demand to a change in central bank policy and affect the transmission lag to inflation. The 
expectations channel could influence transmission to the extent that central bank policy is 
anticipated by the market and priced into the yield curve. 
                                                  
22  See, for instance, Lyziak et al (2006). 
23  See Pruteanu (2004). 
24  See, for instance, Pandit et al (2006). 20  BIS Papers No 35
 
 
The operation of any expectations channel depends on several factors. One is the degree of 
central bank credibility: a higher degree of credibility leads to greater anticipated effects of 
monetary policy and vice versa. A second factor is the degree of predictability of central bank 
actions, which can be improved by increasing transparency and public communication of 
policy. As a third factor, some have argued that a higher degree of commitment by the 
central bank to vary its instrument consistently can enhance the role of the expectations 
channel.
25 One example was the quantitative easing policy followed by the Bank of Japan 
from 2001 to early 2006 to bring an end to deflation in Japan. Under this policy, the Bank of 
Japan announced that it would maintain its zero interest rate policy until inflation was 
sustained at a positive level. The policy was intended to anchor public inflation expectations 
but it also helped to stabilise the long-term interest rate. Inflation targeting may do this in 
much the same way in other countries.  
A review of experience reveals the increasing importance of the expectations channel. One 
indicator is the growing convergence of private sector inflation expectations around the 
central bank’s inflation target in many countries (including the Czech Republic, Colombia, 
Mexico and South Africa) in recent years. A second indicator in several countries is the 
stronger reaction of financial markets to central bank policy announcements. In Thailand, for 
example, the housing and bond market responded to the recent monetary tightening at an 
early stage. With the mortgage interest rate adjusting to an expected rate increase, the 
overall financing cost for homeowners moved up before monetary policy was tightened. In 
Singapore, the volatility of market rates around policy announcement dates has fallen 
significantly following increased communication of the central bank’s monetary policy stance 
to the public.
26 In India, the opening-up of a two-way communication channel between the 
central bank and market participants has increased the signalling role of monetary policy.
27 
As financial markets come to better anticipate central bank policy, the size of policy rate 
adjustments can be reduced. As money market and bond rates move in anticipation of policy 
rate changes, central banks will need to factor in the impact of such movements on demand 
and on their actual policy rate adjustments. Careful monitoring of such feedback effects can 
be crucial. In a sense, market rate movements may often “do the central bank’s work”.  
In a questionnaire response, most central banks said that the growing role of the 
expectations channel has implications for the magnitude of their interest rate response. For 
instance, in the Czech Republic, during the early years of the inflation targeting regime 
(1998 and 1999), the central bank changed its policy rate somewhat aggressively (usually by 
50 basis points). But with inflation expectations becoming well anchored and monetary policy 
actions being better anticipated in recent years, the central bank has reduced the magnitude 
of the policy rate adjustment (usually 25 basis points). In Colombia, the volatility of the policy 
rate has fallen since 2000 following improved credibility of monetary policy.  
Greater credibility of monetary policy allows a central bank to pursue a countercyclical policy 
that it could not safely pursue in the past when inflation was high or when its anti-inflation 
commitment was not trusted. In Israel, for instance, more stable nominal wage expectations 
have allowed the central bank to moderate interest rate moves. 
                                                  
25  The often quoted “Taylor rule” is one variant of such a commitment device. For a discussion on optimal policy 
commitment see, for instance, Clarida et al (1999) and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003). 
26  An empirical test conducted by the Monetary Authority of Singapore showed that during 2001–2005 about 
50% of the policy change was priced in by market participants 10 days ahead of the actual policy 
announcement date; see MAS (2005). 
27  Mohan (2005) discusses the channels through which the Reserve Bank of India’s communication policy may 
have helped to increase the effectiveness of monetary policy. See also Mohan (2008). BIS Papers No 35  21
 
 
3.  Has the output and inflation response to monetary policy shocks 
changed? 
This section presents an analysis of output and inflation responses based on a monthly VAR 
model for a sample of countries.
28 The variables considered are industrial output, consumer 
price inflation, the real effective exchange rate, and the nominal short-term interest rate. The 
model was run for two sample periods: the first one covering the period 1990–96 and the 
second, 2000–06. The idea is to compare output and inflation responses in these two periods 
without considering whether a break actually occurred.
29 Following other studies, the variable 
orders are as indicated above, with output entering as the most exogenous and the interest 
rate as the least exogenous variable.
30 The assumption is that the interest rate responds to 
contemporaneous values of all three other variables; viz, output, inflation and the exchange 
rate.
31 
Graphs A1 and A2 in the Annex show impulse responses of output and inflation to one 
standard deviation shock in the interest rate. Such a model is of course a very simple 
representation of the monetary transmission mechanism: for instance, it does not include 
inflation expectations, credit aggregates or commodity prices, all of which have a high degree 
of significance for the inflation process in many countries. The following findings emerge from 
this analysis. 
•  In several countries, the short-run industrial output response to an interest rate 
shock appears to be subdued in both periods. In some countries (for instance India, 
Korea, Thailand and South Africa) the short-run output response seems to have 
increased during the first half of this decade compared with that in the first half of the 
1990s. In most countries, industrial output recovers relatively rapidly following the 
monetary shock. In both periods, the long-run neutrality of monetary policy is 
validated given that output returns to the base level within a period of one to two 
years.  
•  In contrast, the response of inflation to monetary policy shocks appears stronger in 
the first half of the 2000s than in the first half of the 1990s. However, the response 
varies across countries. For some countries (for instance, Mexico and South Africa), 
the response is relatively strong. In a number of other countries (Chile, the Czech 
Republic and India), however, inflation rises for several months before falling in 
response to monetary tightening, suggesting something of a “price puzzle”.
32 One 
explanation is that the assumption of a policy shock being purely exogenous may 
not be valid; in reality, the monetary authorities look at a much wider set of 
information about the economy. Consequently, both inflation and the interest rate 
may rise together for some time before the contractionary impact of monetary policy 
                                                  
28  The countries are India, Indonesia, Korea and Thailand from Asia; Chile and Mexico from Latin America; the 
Czech Republic and Poland from central Europe; and South Africa. 
29  The second half of the 1990s was excluded from the model to allow for the fact that many Asian economies 
went through a crisis during this period and that having different estimation periods for different countries 
might affect the comparability of results. 
30  See, for instance, Christiano et al (1999) and Castelnuovo and Surico (2006). 
31  The base model was run with three lags and with absolute values of inflation and the interest rate and 
changes in industrial output and the real exchange rate. In subsequent estimations, to check for model 
robustness, several alternative specifications were attempted. These included a longer lag length and first 
differencing of the interest rate and inflation as well as a measure of the industrial output gap instead of levels. 
Given that the results are not very different across specifications, the findings are based on the base model. 




33 A second explanation is that a “cost channel” might be in operation 
whereby higher interest rates raise the costs of working capital and, in turn, prices 
before firms adjust supply in response to lower demand. Some have argued that the 
importance of the cost channel may rise as financial “frictions” decline, leading to 
increased pass-through of policy rate changes to working capital costs; see, for 
instance, Chowdhury et al (2006). 
These results are supported by the variance decomposition analyses: 
•  The longer-run impact of monetary policy on inflation differs across countries. In a 
number of countries, the impact seems to have increased significantly between the 
first half of the 1990s and the first half of this decade. For instance, in Indonesia, 
Mexico and South Africa the variance in inflation explained by interest rates two 
years after the monetary policy shock appears to have increased from 2–5% during 
the first period to 10–30% in the second period.  
•  In contrast, in several other countries (India, Korea, Thailand, Chile, the Czech 
Republic and Poland), the variance in inflation explained by the interest rate appears 
to be small and to have fallen in the first half of this decade (from 1–14% following 
two years of shocks during 1990–96 to 2–3% during 2000–06).
34 
•  As regards the variance in industrial output explained by the interest rate, the picture 
is similar. With the exception of South Africa, in several countries it varies from 1 to 
8% after a gap of two years.  
What could explain such a difference? One explanation could be that the model does not 
adequately capture the dynamics of the transmission mechanism in some countries because 
it omits several other channels and includes only partial estimates of output.
35 Another could 
be an experience similar to that of industrial economies where the decline in the share of 
output and inflation volatility explained by the interest rate is related to the relative stability of 
inflation and output.
36 The argument is that, to the extent that monetary policy may now 
systematically respond to various shocks with an objective of stabilising inflation and output, 
one would expect a reduction of inflation and output variability due to monetary policy 
innovations. The role of expectations is crucial in this context.  
4.  Balance sheet developments and transmission 
This section discusses three major issues for the transmission mechanism related to 
changes in the balance sheet position of the private sector. It focuses on both current and 
possible future implications. One is the nature and the extent of changes in household 
                                                  
33  Bernanke (2004) links such price puzzles to autonomous increases in inflation expectations, particularly in 
countries where such expectations are not sufficiently well anchored. 
34   But this does not necessarily mean that monetary policy measures have become less effective: as argued in 
the previous section, a more credible policy framework may well anchor inflation expectations without large 
changes in interest rates being necessary. 
35  One limitation of the model is its recursive ordering of the shocks. A structural VAR with a different ordering 
scheme may produce different results. However, implementing such a model for a large number of economies 
poses a difficult task. 
36  For instance, in the context of the United States, Boivin and Giannoni (2002) reported that the variance in 
output explained by monetary policy in the United States had fallen from 20% in a pre-1980s sample   
(1963–79) to 3% for the post-1984 sample (1984–97) and that of inflation from 14% to 6% during the same 
period. They attribute this finding to the greater success of monetary policy in stabilising inflation and output. BIS Papers No 35  23
 
 
balance sheets implied by the recent rapid growth in household credit. The second is the 
ways in which recent corporate financial disintermediation might change the response of 
investment to monetary policy changes. A third issue is the impact of recent structural 
changes in the balance sheets of banks. 
Implications of increased household lending 
An important development since Kamin et al (1998) that has potential major implications for 
monetary transmission has been the greatly increased proportion of bank lending going to 
households (Table A12 in the Annex).
37 This has been accompanied by a rise in household 
debt as a percentage of disposable income in several countries, and growing household 
leverage ratio (debt as a percentage of household assets) in some countries (Table A13 in 
the Annex). 
This in effect has relaxed household budget constraints, which could make the intertemporal 
substitution effects of monetary policy more powerful. In the past, in many countries, 
households were able to borrow relatively little from banks; during the past decade this has 
changed, increasing the substitution effects of monetary policy changes. At the same time, 
higher debt levels mean that changes in the policy rate can also generate substantial income 
effects as debt servicing payments amount to a greater share of household income. Such 
income effects could also be non-linear, rising substantially as the household debt levels rise 
beyond a certain threshold. 
A second implication is that changes in the household balance sheet can lead to potential 
wealth effects from monetary policy, particularly through the housing market. Housing has 
become an important component of wealth in many countries, with possible implications for 
consumption. Such an effect could be reinforced by the use of housing as collateral.
38 
A third potential implication of changes in household balance sheets is linked to the cash flow 
effects of monetary policy on consumption and residential investment. Many factors influence 
the impact of policy on household cash flows: nominal interest rates; the size of gross 
financial liabilities and assets; and the nature of financial contracts. The argument is that high 
interest rates impose a cash flow constraint on prospective borrowers: the classic example is 
housing affordability indices, which have fallen in recent years following a large reduction in 
nominal interest rates. For existing borrowers, cash flow effects are substantial to the extent 
that they could refinance a previous loan at a lower rate. Households with a relatively high 
debt-to-income ratio tend to be relatively more cash constrained than others, exhibiting a 
higher degree of sensitivity to interest rate changes.
39 
Similarly, larger flows of financial liabilities produce stronger cash flow effects from a given 
change in the interest rate. With the exception of central Europe and Turkey, the ratio of 
gross financial liabilities flows of the personal sector to GDP has actually fallen in most 
countries over the past decade (Annex Table A14). In several cases, such a trend might 
reflect borrower prudence following a series of financial crises in the mid-1990s. If so, 
                                                  
37   For instance, as Table A12 shows, the share of mortgage credit in total bank credit in many emerging market 
economies (say between 20 and 40% in 2005) has recently exceeded that seen in the United States (25%). 
This is also the case for consumer credit (10–30% in several countries) led by a significant increase in credit 
card lending by banks. 
38  In addition, it is possible that greater borrowing opportunities allow younger households with little capital to 
“save” in the form of bigger houses, pushing up prices and stimulating demand. This would be dependent on 
the consumption response of those who do not own homes and whether they cut their spending in response to 
a rise in the cost of a future house purchase. 
39  See Grenville (1995) and Kneeshaw (1995) for a discussion on cash flow effects associated with monetary 
policy. 24  BIS Papers No 35
 
 
improved macroeconomic conditions and continued credit growth may reverse this trend. In 
contrast, in many countries the share of mortgage debt in the gross financial liabilities of the 
personal sector has increased.  
As regards the nature of financial contracts, the shorter the duration of a loan contract, the 
more frequently it will be rolled over to reflect new interest rates, and hence the more quickly 
changes in policy rates will lead to changes in income and cash flows. The maturity structure 
of household loans is relatively short in many emerging market economies compared with 
industrial economies. Another important factor is the degree of indexation of financial 
contracts to inflation and the exchange rate which can aggravate cash flow effects of 
monetary policy. The rapid growth in foreign currency borrowing by households in central 
Europe over the past five years has increased their exposure to significant income and cash 
flow effects from changes in the exchange rate. In contrast, in those Asian and Latin 
American countries where a large proportion of debt had in the past been indexed to inflation 
and the exchange rate (a major vulnerability in earlier crises), indexation has generally been 
reduced. 
What might be even more important is the extent to which households are borrowing at 
variable interest rates. Table A15 in the Annex shows that variable rate contracts dominate 
emerging mortgage markets. Fixed rate contracts are relatively important in Israel, the Czech 
Republic and Mexico. In addition, in most countries mortgage rates are either linked directly 
to the policy rate or indirectly through the banks’ prime lending rate. Nevertheless, mortgage 
lending rates in a number of countries are subject to a maximum limit. Although similar 
information about consumer lending (particularly through credit cards) is not available, in 
most countries such loans tend to be at variable rates and of short-term duration. 
In countries with primarily fixed rate lending, households will be insulated from movements in 
the policy rate. The burden of adjustment in this case shifts to lenders who might have 
funded themselves at adjustable interest rates.
40 Only new borrowers will be affected by such 
changes in interest rate. Much will also depend on how households view a particular change 
in the interest rate and on their forward-looking behaviour. If at the trough of the cycle, 
households expect the interest rate to go up, they might in effect raise precautionary saving 
by increasing repayments so as to maintain a constant debt repayment plus interest service 
rate. They may in short behave as if the interest rate is fixed over the cycle: see Debelle (2004). 
Corporate balance sheets and the transmission mechanism 
The impact of monetary policy on non-residential investment depends in part on the balance 
sheet position of corporations. As Kamin et al (1998) note, when initial balance sheet 
positions are strong – that is, assets far exceed debt repayment obligations – the probability 
of future financial distress may remain low even after a marked reduction in the value of 
asset holdings, and therefore expenditures may be little affected. But if balance sheet 
positions are weak, the same reduction in asset values may increase the probability of 
insolvency, and so lead to a sharp and sudden fall in borrowing and spending. Such effects 
may be more marked in the emerging market context because capital market imperfections 
limit borrowing possibilities severely. The impact of monetary tightening could therefore be 
accentuated by the so-called “financial accelerator” where weak corporate balance sheets 
may act to exaggerate the impact of a rise in the interest rate.
41 
                                                  
40   Yet an easy monetary policy could still have an impact to the extent that households might choose to 
refinance their mortgages at lower interest rates. 
41  See Bernanke et al (1999). BIS Papers No 35  25
 
 
Trends in corporate balance sheet variables 
Various indicators may capture the balance sheet vulnerability of firms to monetary policy 
shocks. One important measure is net worth, the ratio of net assets to income. Another is the 
ratio of debt to assets, which measures leveraging and may be better correlated with the 
probability that firms will have difficulty meeting scheduled debt service obligations. The 
degree of leveraging also indicates the prospective size of cash flow effects resulting from 
monetary policy measures as interest payments on debt rise. The latter effect could be 














CN TH MY CO IN MX CL AR CZ KR HU BR PL TR RU US JP DE
AR = Argentina; BR = Brazil; CL = Chile; CN = China; CO = Colombia; CZ = Czech Republic; DE = Germany; HU = Hungary; IN = India;
JP = Japan; KR = Korea; MX = Mexico; MY = Malaysia; PL = Poland; RU = Russia; TH = Thailand; TR = Turkey; US = United States.
1 The internal resources index is defined as the ratio between the sum of cash flow from operations, plus decreases in inventories
and receivables, plus increases in payables, over the sum of capital expenditures. This index is the complement to the Rajan and




Unfortunately, data on many of these indicators are not available consistently across 
countries. Nevertheless, what information there is suggests that the typical corporate 
leverage ratio in emerging markets has often been surprisingly higher than in industrial 
countries; see IMF (2005). For instance, the average corporate leverage ratio in Asia stood 
at 38% between 1993 and 2003, compared with 24% for the G3 countries. Latin America and 
emerging Europe have comparatively low ratios (26% and 28%, respectively). One factor 
often cited for a relatively high leverage ratio of emerging market firms is their comparatively 
low market-value-to-book-value ratio, which encourages firms to finance investment through 
debt rather than equity. On the other hand, in several emerging market economies firms tend 
to rely more heavily on internal funds than those in industrial countries, which may help 
constrain the leverage ratio (Graph 5). 
One major indicator of how the balance sheet position of firms may have changed in more 
recent years is given by trends in gross financial liability flows of the non-financial corporate 
sector (Annex Table 16). In most countries, such liabilities as a percentage of GDP fell 
sharply – in some cases dramatically – between 1995–97 and 2003–05. There are a few 
exceptions, such as Thailand, where the appetite of firms to borrow did rise following the 
1997–98 financial crisis. In a number of Asian economies (for instance, China and India) in 
recent years, firms have funded a larger part of their investment out of (growing) profits. This 
is also true, albeit to a lesser extent, in other regions, particularly in crisis-hit countries. In 
Argentina, firms have mostly relied on self-financing (to the extent of 80% of their new capital 
spending) for investment following the recent crisis. Similarly, in Turkey the corporate 
leverage ratio has fallen steadily since 2001 following a sharp rise in corporate profits. 26  BIS Papers No 35
 
 
There have also been significant changes in the composition of corporate debt. Three major 
trends are discernible from Table 7. First, the share of bank debt in total liabilities fell in a 
number of countries between 1995–97 and 2003–05. Second, with firms’ increasing access 
to both local and international bond markets, the share of market debt in total liabilities has 
increased in several countries. Third, there has been a significant rise in equity financing by 
the corporate sector, particularly in Asia, where stock valuations have seen rapid growth over 
the past few years. 
 
Table 7 
Composition of outstanding financial liabilities 
of the non-financial corporate sector 
In percentages 
  Bank loans  Commercial paper and 
bonds  Equities 
  82–84 95–97 03–05 82–84 95–97 03–05 82–84 95–97 03–05 
Latin  America           
Argentina   24.0 21.9   41.7 33.5   34.3 44.6 
Chile     20.9    34.7   
1 
Colombia
2 20.7  36.3  32.2  13.2  35.7 40.0 66.1 28.0 28.0 
Mexico   40.2
3 26.4
3   7.6
4 11.1
4      
Peru   95.0 80.0    5.0 20.0    0.0  0.0 
A s i a            
India
5 27.0  17.2  34.2  8.1  14.4 –3.2  6.2 16.3 24.2 
Korea 54.3  36.4  32.4  19.6  22.3 14.6 26.1 14.5 24.6 
Malaysia
6   73.6 55.0   24.1 43.6       
Philippines   5.3      16.4     
   
Singapore 68.8  40.4
7 42.7
7 5.3  8.5
8 7.8
8 25.9  10.4
9 5.7
9 
Thailand   66.4 48.5    2.2  5.8   31.4 45.8 
Central  Europe           
Czech Republic
2   28.9 19.7    1.9  2.7   38.4 43.7 
Hungary     19.9
10 23.7
10  1.2 0.3    58.0  55.0 
Poland
11     17.9    2.5    57.9 
South Africa     28.1  41.9    6.0 16.5   82.4 65.8 
M e m o :            
United States  24.9  12.6  11.9  18.5 15.1 19.6 56.6 72.3 68.4 
Note: Data for 1982–84 refer to Table 9 in Kamin et al (1998).
 
1  In terms of flows, equities represent a share of 15%.    
2  Refers to 1996–97 and 2003–04.    
3  Includes 
foreign and domestic bank financing.    
4  Includes foreign and domestic debt issues.    
5  Data are based on a 
sample of selected companies and refer to the financial years 1996–97 and 2004–05.    
6  Refers to 1997 and 
2005. For equities, only the share to total gross flow of financial liabilities can be provided: 20.3 (1997) and 
35.3 (2003–05).    
7  Including other loans.    
8  Long-term loans and debentures.    
9  Shareholders’ equity.   
10    Bank loans and credits from other sectors. Credits from non-financial corporate sector were excluded.    
11  Refers to 2003 and 2004. 
Sources: US Flow of Funds; national data (questionnaire); BIS statistics. BIS Papers No 35  27
 
 
Will corporate deleveraging and financial diversification reduce the power of monetary policy? 
The implications of recent changes in the corporate balance sheet for the monetary 
transmission process can go in several directions, and their relative importance is difficult to 
determine. On the one hand, lower corporate debt could ease cash flow constraints on firms, 
reducing the investment response to monetary tightening. Stronger corporate balance sheets 
could also weaken the role of the financial accelerator discussed above. 
In addition, the reduced reliance of firms on bank loans could weaken the bank lending 
channel, particularly if firms can now more easily access commercial paper and bond 
markets as alternative funding sources. Similarly, the increased use of derivatives may 
protect firms from future interest rate and exchange rate shocks, reducing cash flows and 
debt servicing volatility and thereby balance sheet vulnerability.
42 The impact of financial 
market liberalisation, increasing the access of firms to the global capital market, may go in 
the same direction. In particular, large firms can increasingly switch from domestic to foreign 
financing when monetary policy is tightened. 
On the other hand, better functioning capital markets could enhance the degree of pass-
through of policy rates to the prices of a wider range of financial assets and so strengthen the 
direct cost impacts of monetary policy changes on investment. Similarly, to the extent that 
more liquid markets and actively traded securities increase the potential valuation effects of 
interest rate changes on the balance sheets of firms, investment spending might also 
become more responsive to changes in the policy rate. Changes in expectations about 
monetary policy could now play a more important role (than in the past) in firms’ financial 
conditions. 
Implications of changes in bank balance sheets 
As already noted, the better health and greater productivity of the banking system in many 
emerging markets has been associated with several changes to the monetary transmission 
mechanism. On the one hand, it has probably led to a stronger direct cost channel. The 
paper from the central bank of Malaysia shows that the long-run pass-through from the 
overnight rate to the lending rate has increased steadily from 0.3 in 1989 to 0.6 in 2005 with 
associated increases in competition and efficiency in the banking system: see Ooi (2008). On 
the other hand, the decline in the balance sheet vulnerability of banks reduces non-price 
related distortions on credit supply and hence may reduce the importance of the bank 
lending channel in many countries. High capital levels and the increased access of banks to 
alternative sources of funding through certificates of deposit and long-term bonds (for 
instance, in Chile) will have similar effects by relaxing resource constraints on banks, 
particularly during monetary tightening.  
Growing market risk exposure for banks 
Yet some of these balance sheet changes and other changes may have altered the 
significance of some transmission channels. One question is the extent to which changes in 
banks’ balance sheets might have affected their exposure to market risks and whether 
changes in monetary policy could aggravate such exposures. 
Table A17 in the Annex provides information on the duration and maturity of banking system 
deposits and loans. In several countries, the share of lending at variable interest rates 
                                                  
42  On the other hand, the development of derivatives could also reduce market segmentation, reducing firms’ 
ability to substitute alternative funding sources in response to monetary policy changes. On balance, evidence 
suggests that increased use of derivatives may have reduced investment response to monetary policy shocks 
in several countries; see Gomez et al (2005), who provide evidence in the context of Colombia. 28  BIS Papers No 35
 
 
exceeds that of deposits. With increased pass-through of the policy rate, this could increase 
banks’ interest rate exposure if their average funding cost does not vary sufficiently with 
monetary policy. Nevertheless, such exposures can be managed by a proper hedging 
strategy. In several other countries (for example, South Africa), banks have tended to pass on 
such risks to borrowers by mobilising more deposits at variable interest rates. 
As regards maturity mismatches, the average maturity of deposits in most countries is 
shorter than loans, which makes the cash flow of banks vulnerable to refinancing risks. This 
is particularly true in Latin America (with the exception of Chile), where the average maturity 


















AR = Argentina; CL = Chile; CN = China; CO = Colombia; CZ = Czech Republic; HK = Hong Kong SAR; HU = Hungary;
ID = Indonesia; IL = Israel; IN = India; KR = Korea; MX = Mexico; MY = Malaysia; PE = Peru; PH = Philippines; PL = Poland;
SA = Saudi Arabia; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand; TR = Turkey; VE = Venezuela; ZA = South Africa.
Source: National data (questionnaire).
Annual average as a percentage of total assets
Commercial banks’ holdings of government and central bank securities
 
Another major source of exposure to monetary policy shocks could arise from the investment 
portfolios of banks. Over the past decade, commercial bank investment in government 
securities has increased, raising its share in total assets (Graph 6). In several countries, such 
a trend has recently been associated with large-scale intervention to resist exchange rate 
appreciation. Central banks have sold government or their own securities to commercial 
banks to sterilise excess liquidity.
43 The increased exposure of banks to bond markets 
increases the probability of large valuation changes for banks. This could well have financial 
accelerator effects. Banks might expand credit rapidly during an easing phase, as their 
capital gains and trading profits from bond holdings rise, while cutting back lending as losses 
mount during periods of monetary tightening. Such a reaction function would magnify the 
demand impact of monetary policy changes. Another potential, more insidious, implication is 
that it could influence central banks’ interest rate response, to the extent that worries about 
the stability of the banking system might delay or attenuate needed monetary tightening. 
Dollarisation 
As regards banks’ exposure to currency mismatches, Table 8 below shows the share of 
foreign currency in assets and liabilities in emerging economies’ banking systems; see 
                                                  
43  See Mohanty and Turner (2006) for a discussion on potential changes to bank lending behaviour associated 
with such sterilised intervention. BIS Papers No 35  29
 
 
Table A18 for country details. Although the degree of “dollarisation” (or “euroisation” in the 
context of emerging Europe) of the banking system
44 has fallen over the past decade, it 
continues to be high in several cases. In most countries (outside of central Europe) the 
degree of asset-side dollarisation tends to be of roughly similar order to that on the liability 
side, suggesting that the direct exposure of the banking system to exchange rate risk is 
probably low. But banks’ borrowers may have currency mismatches – and so they remain 
exposed through the credit risk channel. 
 
Table 8 
Currency denomination of bank balance sheets
1 
Percentage denominated in foreign currency 
 Assets  Liabilities 
  2000 2005 2000 2005 
Latin America
2  30.1 15.7 29.6 14.5 
Asia
3  13.4 11.0 14.6 12.3 







6 10.5  8.0  11.9  9.6 
Central Europe
7  23.1 25.0 21.1 18.7 
Other emerging economies
8  25.8 22.6 27.6 22.5 
Total  16.4 12.4 17.3 12.9 
Memo:      
United  States  0.7 0.8 0.8 0.7 
Japan 12.7  21.3  9.1  12.9 
1  Indicators shown are expressed as a percentage of GDP; aggregated using 2000 GDP and PPP weights.   
2  Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.    
3  Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.    
4  Refers to Asian Currency Unit (ACU) assets and 
foreign notes and coins, net amount due from banks, negotiable certificates of deposit (NCDs) held, loans to 
non-bank customers and bills discounted/purchased in the Domestic Banking Unit (DBU). Items that do not 
have breakdowns by S$ and FC in the DBU are excluded.    
5  Refers to ACU liabilities and non-bank deposits, 
NCDs issued, amount due to banks, bills payable in the DBU. Items in the DBU that do not have breakdowns 
by S$ and FC are excluded.    
6  Asia as defined above but excluding Hong Kong SAR and Singapore.    
7  The 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.    
8  Israel, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Turkey.
 
Sources: IMF; national data (questionnaire); BIS statistics. 
 
As Kamin et al (1998) note, the transmission of monetary policy in a dollarised system will 
depend not only on the substitutability between domestic currency assets and dollar assets, but 
also on the substitutability between domestic dollar assets and international dollar assets. 
Because of the presence of default and convertibility risk, domestic dollar and international dollar) 
                                                  
44  Using the definition in Kamin et al (1998) the term dollarisation is defined here as the provision of dollar-
denominated loans and deposits by the domestic banking system, an activity which embraces both the store-
of-value and, to a lesser extent, the transaction function of money. 30  BIS Papers No 35
 
 
assets are likely to be regarded as less than perfect substitutes. This is why dollar interest rates 
in dollarised financial systems have generally exceeded international levels. 
Consideration of cases where markets regard domestic currency assets and dollar assets as 
close substitutes but view domestic and foreign assets as being non-substitutable serves to 
illustrate this point. Assuming limited exchange rate changes, policy-induced increases in 
domestic currency interest rates will induce borrowers to switch to domestic dollar loans and 
savers to shift their assets into domestic currency deposits leading to increases in domestic 
dollar deposit and lending rates. Therefore, monetary policy is effective in this case. 
Conversely, where domestic and foreign dollar assets are highly substitutable, the monetary 
transmission channel will more closely resemble that of a non-dollarised system with perfect 
capital mobility, where the exchange rate channel might play a more important role. Inflation 
and output developments will more likely depend on public expectations of the exchange rate. 
 
The paper from the central bank of Peru illustrates the dilemma facing the central bank in a 
highly dollarised economy: see Rossini and Vega (2008). It shows that monetary policy 
needs to take into consideration currency mismatches and the risk of a run on dollar deposits 
in the banking system.
45 While the central bank has introduced prudential measures to 
control some of the risks, it has combined these with exchange rate intervention to smooth 
currency fluctuations. The paper shows that tighter monetary policy on its own will tend to 
accelerate the short-run impact on inflation and could generate perverse output effects 
through the exchange rate channel. But when combined with exchange market intervention, 
the inflation and output effects of monetary tightening are longer-lasting and more effective. 
Yet excessive foreign exchange intervention runs the risk that people do not internalise risks 
of denominating their debts in foreign currencies. 
Banking sector consolidation and monetary policy transmission 
Another question is how far the trend towards bank consolidation (increased mergers and 
amalgamations of banks and foreign ownership) might affect the transmission mechanism. 
On the one hand, a few large banks may dominate the banking market, which could reduce 
and lower the pass-through of the policy rate to bank deposit and lending rates. On the other 
hand, bank consolidation could increase the effectiveness of the interest rate channel if it 
increased efficiency, reduced transaction costs, and speeded up information processing. 
This would imply a faster transmission of interest rate changes across various segments of 
financial markets. 
The balance of these factors is uncertain since separating the impact of other changes in the 
financial system from bank consolidation is often difficult. However, both research and 
experience in the context of industrial economies have demonstrated that financial 
consolidation has not significantly altered the transmission mechanism for monetary policy: 
see OECD (2001). In some countries, net efficiency gains from financial system 
consolidation have been large, strengthening the pass-through of the policy rate to other 
interest rates. Given the early stage of the development of financial markets in emerging 
market economies, it is more likely that the efficiency aspects dominate other factors, 
increasing the overall effectiveness of monetary policy. 
                                                  
45   See also several papers on the policy implications of dollarisation in Armas et al (2006). BIS Papers No 35  31
 
 
5.  Globalisation and monetary transmission 
The greater financial openness of emerging market economies is evident from a large build-
up of gross foreign asset and liability positions and growing correlation between the prices of 
emerging market and industrial country assets. Two issues have received increasing 
attention in recent discussions about how these developments might affect the monetary 
transmission mechanism.  
Internationalisation and inflation dynamics 
The first issue relates to the implications of globalisation for the dynamics of domestic 
inflation. Trade integration affects the inflation process through the prices of tradable goods 
and through greater labour and product market competition with implications for the degree 
of pass-through of wage and cost increases to inflation. 
There is little new in the debate about the impact of global influences as compared to 
domestic policies on inflation. An OECD study in 1973 noted that increasing integration was 
leading to a greater “internationalisation of the problem of inflation … and this was 
undermining the effectiveness of national stabilisation policies”. But this conclusion, largely 
dependent on the fixed exchange rate regimes prevailing under Bretton Woods, was 
reversed by a 1982 OECD study which concluded that “with more flexible exchange rates, 
changes in policy (and particularly monetary policy) are likely to affect exchange rates and 
thus inflation”.
46 Not all accepted this view: Beckerman and Jenkinson (1986) attributed the 
deceleration in OECD inflation from 1980 to 1982 to the fall in primary product prices, and 
not to the direct impact of higher unemployment. 
Despite various challenges, however, the consensus view is still that domestic monetary 
policies dominate inflation outcomes – especially under flexible exchange rates.
47 A recent 
study by the OECD reported a significant impact of import prices on inflation in most 
industrialised economies since the mid-1990s: see Pain et al (2006). But it added that 
globalisation merely changed the price level of imported goods and services, with a one-time 
effect on inflation. Ihrig et al (2007) showed that while the sensitivity of inflation to the 
domestic output gap has fallen in industrial countries in recent years, there is only weak 
evidence of this being caused by either changes in import prices or global demand. Instead, 
they attributed the reduced sensitivity of inflation to the stabilising impact of increased trade 
openness on domestic output. In short, they found that domestic monetary policy determined 
inflation. The IMF reached a similar conclusion in its recent analysis of inflation in industrial 
economies.
48 
Global demand and supply developments, however, do have a major impact on relative 
prices. The greater effective use of labour in populous low-wage countries has compressed 
the prices of many manufactured goods in recent years. Real oil prices began to rise in 2003 
and have remained high. Partly because higher energy prices have diverted crops to ethanol 
around the world and partly because higher incomes in poor countries have increased the 
                                                  
46   See OECD (1973) and Turner (1982). 
47   See Yellen (2006), IMF (2006b), and Ball (2006). Borio and Filardo (2007) put the contrary case. 
48   In the context of industrial economies, IMF (2006b) estimates that about 50% of the reduction in the sensitivity 
of inflation to domestic output stems from increased openness, while the other 50% is due to improved 
monetary policy credibility. It argues that while the impact of import prices on inflation tends to be large in the 
first two years it falls significantly in the subsequent years, suggesting that import prices only change relative 
prices and not overall inflation over a long-term horizon. See also Ball (2006) who argues that relative price 
changes generated by import prices have no major impact on long-term inflation or inflation expectations and 
hence on the central bank’s response to them. 32  BIS Papers No 35
 
 
demand for food, wholesale food prices have risen substantially. Because food and energy 
represent a comparatively high proportion of the average household’s spending in emerging 
markets, the impact of such price changes on real incomes can be substantial. The 
measurement of inflation then becomes more dependent on the weight of different goods in 
the index basket. 
An additional complexity arises with respect to capital flows. A worldwide rise in food prices, 
for instance, will have a larger impact on the CPI in a low-income country than in a high-
income country. If because of this policy rates are increased more in low-income than in 
high-income countries, then capital flows could induce unwanted exchange rate appreciation 
in low-income countries. All such factors inevitably complicate monetary policy decisions in 
emerging markets. 
Reduced monetary policy independence? 
The question of monetary policy independence and capital flows is examined in an 
accompanying background paper: see Saxena (2008). The famous trilemma from the 
Mundell-Fleming model states that countries cannot simultaneously fix their exchange rate, 
have an open capital account, and pursue an independent monetary policy. Only two out of 
these three objectives are mutually consistent. Since 2000, emerging markets have seen an 
increase in the flexibility of exchange rates and also more open capital accounts. While an 
open capital account would imply a stronger link between domestic and foreign interest rates, 
this link can be weakened given a willingness to allow the exchange rate to fluctuate. 
Saxena (2008) finds that the response of domestic interest rates to changes in the US 
interest rate (a proxy used for world interest rates) is higher for countries with flexible 
exchange rates and higher capital mobility than in countries with fixed exchange rates and 
mobile capital (especially during 2000–06). The results suggest that high capital mobility may 
be leading to a greater co-movement of domestic and foreign interest rates.
 49 However, the 
response of domestic interest rates to changes in foreign interest rates has decreased since 
2000 (compared with 1990–99), implying that as emerging market economies gain credibility 
with their newer forms of monetary policies, a further delinking between these interest rates 
might be expected. 
6. Conclusion 
The papers in this volume throw some new light on the old question of how monetary policy 
affects the economy in the emerging market economies. Policy transmission channels have 
changed in several important ways since the publication of Kamin et al (1998). Although the 
experiences of EMEs differ in many respects, some general conclusions are possible. Fiscal 
dominance has been largely overcome, and attempts to suppress inflation by currency 
overvaluation (sometimes at the price of non-convertibility) have been abandoned. Monetary 
policy frameworks have become more credible, and central banks more flexible in their 
operations. These shifts and the associated balance sheet changes have strengthened the 
interest rate channel. It is because of better monetary policies that inflation in most EMEs 
has become lower and less volatile. 
                                                  
49  This result could also reflect the fact that exchange rates have not been sufficiently flexible in practice, as 
many central banks have intervened in the foreign exchange market to stabilise them. BIS Papers No 35  33
 
 
As the channels of transmission will continue to change as economies evolve, central banks 
need to remain alert to the implications of such changes as they calibrate their policy 
responses to macroeconomic developments. 
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3 Exchange  rate
4   
1990–99 2000–Q206 1990–99 2000–Q206 1990–99 2000–Q206
Latin America           
Argentina   5.9   8.3    2,584.3   12.1    3,712.5   81.6 
Brazil   8.7   2.0    1,138.3   3.2    1,211.9   20.8 
Chile   9.1   1.7    7.3   1.1    6.7   11.5 
Colombia   4.0   1.8    5.6   1.6    11.3   13.3 
Mexico   3.9   2.6    10.5   2.0    26.0  6.4 
Peru   6.8   3.0    2,162.9   1.4    2,280.5  3.1 
Venezuela    4.3   11.3   23.1   7.1   41.7   26.3 
Asia        
China   1.8   1.3    8.2   1.6    16.1  0.9 
Hong Kong SAR     3.8    4.0    4.4    2.0    0.2    0.3 
India   1.2   2.3    3.6   0.9    11.5  4.2 
Indonesia   7.0   1.1    18.1   4.4    85.9   14.0 
Korea   4.9   2.4    2.3   0.8    19.0  8.1 
Malaysia   5.6   2.9    1.0   0.9    16.0  0.9 
Philippines   2.6   1.6    4.0   2.0    16.0  7.8 
Singapore   4.0   5.0    1.3   0.8    6.9  3.1 
Thailand   7.5   1.7    2.2   1.7    19.3  6.6 
Central Europe        
Czech  Republic   1.4   1.6   15.8   1.6   11.7  9.8 
Hungary   1.8   1.0    7.2   2.6    6.7   12.3 
Poland   1.8   1.9    19.2   3.3    7.2  7.8 
Other emerging 
economies 
      
Israel   5.8   3.9    4.6   2.5    5.3  6.2 
Russia   5.0   1.5    293.9   4.5   137.2  7.6 
Saudi  Arabia   3.4   3.1    2.5   1.0    0.0  0.0 
South  Africa   2.3   1.0   3.6    3.1   9.1    21.2 
Turkey   6.1   6.1    16.5    22.7    41.4   40.2 
M e m o :         
United  States   1.5   1.3   1.1    0.8   1.0    1.0 
Euro  area   1.2   1.1    1.1   0.2    9.6   11.3 
Japan   2.1   1.5    1.3   0.4    11.6  8.6 
1  Measured as the standard deviation of annual changes of quarterly averages; in per cent.    
2  Real GDP.   
3  Consumer prices.    
4  National currency per US dollar. 
Source: National data. 







Fiscal balance  Central bank credit 
to government  Public debt 
 
1990–99 2000–06 1990–99 2000–05  2000  2006 
Latin America        
Argentina   –1.9    –5.6    4.0    11.7    51.0    70.9 
Brazil   –3.7    –3.7    26.8    16.6    48.8    50.1 
Chile   1.5    1.4    16.9    8.5    14.0    5.9 
Colombia   –1.8    –2.4    1.3    1.1    47.7    46.3 
Mexico   –4.1    –2.7    1.4    0.0    49.3    43.1 
Peru   –2.8    –1.6    0.3    0.1    45.5    35.3 
Venezuela   –2.8    –0.3    6.0   1.1    27.3   35.8 
Asia        
China   –2.2    –2.2    3.2    2.0    16.4    17.2 
Hong Kong SAR     1.7    –1.8    …    …    0.0    1.7 
India   –7.7    –8.6    11.8    4.4    75.0    80.9 
Indonesia   –0.3    –1.6    3.7    14.3    52.1    25.0 
Korea   –1.0    1.9    0.9    0.8    16.3    28.1 
Malaysia   0.6    –4.5    1.3    0.2    36.7    43.5 
Philippines   –1.7    –3.4    9.3    3.0    64.6    71.8 
Singapore   10.0    5.5    0.0    3.7    84.1    97.8 
Thailand   1.2    –0.1    1.5    1.9    56.9    43.9 
Central Europe        
Czech Republic    –0.7    –3.4   1.2    0.3    15.2    26.6 
Hungary   –5.1    –6.7    49.2    7.3    55.0    67.2 
Poland   –3.4    –4.9    5.0    0.9    37.7    48.4 
Other emerging 
economies        
Israel   –4.3    –4.0    4.8    2.0    87.0    95.3 
Russia   –9.3    4.3    12.4    4.1    62.5    13.9 
Saudi Arabia    –8.2    5.1    …    …    87.2    15.2 
South Africa    –4.3    –1.1   1.7    2.2    42.9    32.8 
Turkey   –8.5    –12.3    3.9    12.3    68.8    71.1 
M e m o :         
United States    –2.8    –2.7   4.9    5.8    57.2    62.5 
Euro area    –4.1    –2.2    1.7    1.9    69.6    69.8 
Japan   –2.8    –6.8    6.5    17.6    142.5    181.8 
1  Indicators shown are expressed as a percentage of GDP. 
Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook; JP Morgan, Emerging markets debt and fiscal indicators, 
October 2006; ECLAC; national data. 





Degree of openness 
Trade openness
1 Financial  openness
2 
 
1990 2000 2005 1990 2000 2005
3 
Latin America        
Argentina   15.6    22.7    45.0    67.8    124.0    167.3 
Brazil   13.2    22.8    29.2    44.0    89.5    82.7 
Chile   61.4    60.1    74.5    134.1    181.7    186.2 
Colombia   33.6    36.0    40.3    77.9    88.1    96.4 
Mexico   30.3    42.5    41.8    70.3    72.9    83.5 
Peru   28.3    33.9    43.6    102.9    113.2    92.0 
Asia        
China   26.8    44.2    69.3    38.9    84.7    96.2 
Hong Kong SAR    254.2    283.7    383.4   1,462.9    1,246.5    1,439.5 
India   16.4    28.8    44.3    30.2    42.3    57.8 
Indonesia   48.4    76.0    66.4    80.6    136.8    100.7 
Korea   56.7    78.0    82.3    35.4    82.7    109.2 
Malaysia   147.2    228.9    222.5    141.3    211.4    254.4 
Philippines   57.5    117.6    100.0    95.0    143.3    137.3 
Singapore   359.5    377.7    456.1    361.3    809.5    1,023.2 
Thailand   81.8    125.0    152.2    68.8    142.7    125.0 
Central Europe        
Czech Republic    39.8    129.4   141.2     146.4    147.4 
Hungary   69.7    151.6    137.2    63.7    157.7    173.5 
Poland   46.8    60.4    74.1    117.1    86.5    116.6 
Other emerging 
economies        
Algeria   54.7    62.6    71.3    74.2    87.1    96.1 
Israel   68.2    76.4    88.9    112.6    167.4    207.4 
Russia   16.9    67.6    56.7      168.5    135.6 
Saudi Arabia    79.3    73.3    89.1    162.6    100.8    114.4 
South Africa    43.0    52.8   55.7    51.3   139.7    135.3 
Turkey   34.2    61.8    65.5    45.4    96.3    103.9 
Memo:        
United States    19.8    25.7   26.2    80.1   166.2    198.3 
Euro area    55.3    72.6    74.1      212.5    261.5 
Japan   20.5    21.3    28.1    111.4    100.4    154.4 
United Kingdom    50.5    58.2    56.2    351.2   618.2   759.6 
1  Defined as the sum of imports and exports as a ratio to GDP.    
2  Measured as the sum of gross stocks of 
foreign assets and liabilities as a ratio to GDP.    
3  Data refer to 2004 for Mexico, India, Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Poland, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Turkey. 
Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006). 




















  1997  2006  1997  2006  1997  2006  1997  2006  1997  2006 
Latin America                     
Argentina   Yes    Yes        Yes     
Brazil     Yes            Yes   
Chile No  Yes  (Yes)  Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Colombia (Yes)  Yes  (Yes)  Yes  (Yes)    (Yes)  Yes  No   
Mexico No    Yes    No    Yes  Yes  No   
Peru       Yes
1  No  No    No  No  No 
Venezuela No    No    No    Yes    No  Yes 
Asia                     
China               Yes  Yes   
Hong Kong SAR  No    Yes  Yes  (No)    Yes  Yes  No   
India No 
2  No 
2  No    No  Yes
3  No  Yes
4 
Indonesia No  Yes  Yes    No    Yes    No   
Korea No  Yes  No  Yes  No    No    No   
Malaysia No    No    No    Yes  Yes  No  Yes
5 
Philippines   Yes    Yes    No    Yes    No
6 
Singapore     Yes  Yes      Yes    No   
Thailand
7   Yes  Yes  Yes  No    Yes    No   
Central Europe                     
Czech Republic    No    No
8    No    No    No 
Hungary       Yes             
Poland       Yes        Yes     
Other emerging 
economies                     
Israel Yes  Yes    –    No  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Russia         No    Yes    No   
Saudi Arabia  No    Yes  Yes  No    Yes    No   
South Africa    Largely   No    No    Partly    No 
Turkey       Yes             
Note: Data for 1997 refer to Table 6 in Kamin et al (1998). 
1  This interest rate is a main component in banking funding.    
2  Interest rates on deposits (except as indicated 
in the last column) have been deregulated and are decided by the banks themselves. The deposit rates are 
influenced by the Reserve Bank’s policy rates.    
3  Bulk deposits.    
4  Saving deposits and foreign currency 
deposits.    
5  Minimum rates were prescribed for fixed deposit balances of RM1 million and below (with the 
exception of deposits placed by non-SME corporations and non-residents) for tenures between one and 
12 months.    
6  Refers to a typical domestic commercial bank.    
7  Others: competition from other saving 
alternatives and competition among banks.    
8  Little short-run link, but there is an effect in the long run. 
Source: National data (questionnaire). 




















1997 2006 1997 2006 1997 2006 1997 2006 1997 2006
Latin America            
Argentina   Yes  Yes      Yes    
Brazil            
Chile   Yes  Yes   No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
Colombia (Yes)  Yes  (Yes) Yes (Yes)    (Yes) Yes  No  Yes 
Mexico     Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes    
Peru       Yes
1 No  No    No  No  No 
Venezuela No  Yes  No    No    Yes  Yes  No  Yes 
Asia            
China           Yes  Yes 
Hong Kong SAR  No    (Yes) Yes  No    Yes  Yes  No   
India No 
2  No 
2  No   Yes  Yes  No  Yes
3 
Indonesia No    Yes    No    Yes    No  Yes
4 
Korea
5 (Yes)    (Yes)   No    Yes    No   
Malaysia  Yes  Yes   No   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
6 
Philippines   Yes  Yes   No   Yes  No
7 
Singapore     Yes  Yes    Yes   No  
Thailand   Yes  Yes  Yes  No    Yes    No  Yes
8 
Central Europe            
Czech Republic    No    Yes    No    No    No 
Hungary       Yes        Yes     
Poland       Yes        Yes     
Other emerging 
economies            
Israel Yes  Yes    –    No    Yes  No  No 
Saudi Arabia  No    Yes  Yes  No    Yes    No   
South  Africa    Yes   No  No   Partly   No 
Turkey       Yes             
Note: Data for 1997 refer to Table 7 in Kamin et al (1998). 
1  This interest rate is a main component in banking funding.    
2  Interest rates on loans (except as indicated in 
the last column) have been deregulated and are decided by the banks themselves. The lending rates are 
influenced by the Reserve Bank’s policy rates.    
3  Export credit rate.    
4  Blanket Guarantee Rate.    
5  An 
additional item is the market int e r e s t  ra t e  (C D ,  e t c . ) .     
6    Applicable to prescribed rate for loans extended 
through special funds administered by Bank Negara Malaysia and the ceiling on lending rates for housing loans 
extended to low-income groups. In addition, rates on hire purchase loans are subject to the Hire Purchase Act 
1967, while rates on credit card loans are subject to the Credit Card Guideline issued by Bank Negara Malaysia.  
7  Refers to a typical domestic commercial bank.    
8  Only for credit card and personal loans. 
Source: National data (questionnaire). 







Reserve requirement ratio 
 
1990 1998 2000 2006 
Remuneration 
(latest) 
Latin America       
Argentina   5.0–88.0      15.0–22.0    14.0–35.0  BM 
Chile   4.0–10.0    9.0    3.6–9.0    3.6–9.0  No 
Colombia   18.2    31.0    4.8    5.7  BM 
Mexico   0.0    0.0    0.0    0.0   
Peru   52.5    7.0    7.0    6.0  No 
Venezuela   15.0    17.0    17.0    15.0  No 
Asia        
China       6.0    8.5  BM 
Hong Kong SAR  No  No  No  No  No 
India   15.0    10.0    8.0    5.0  No 
Indonesia   2.0    3.0–5.0    5.0    5.0–13.0  BM 
Korea   1.0–11.5    3.1    1.0–11.5    1.0–5.0   
Malaysia   6.5    13.5    4.0    4.0  No 
Philippines   25.0      9.7    10.1  Yes 
Singapore   6.0    6.0    3.0    3.0  No 
Thailand   2.0  No    1.0    1.0  No 
Central Europe        
Czech Republic    8.0      2.0    2.0  Yes 
Hungary   11.0    12.0    11    5.0  MR 
Poland   9.9–20.8      5.0    0.0–3.5  BM 
Other emerging 
economies 
      
Israel   0.0–10.0    8.0    0.0–6.0    0.0–6.0  No 
Saudi Arabia    2.0–7.0    7.0    2.0–7.0    2.0–7.0  No 
South Africa    2.0–5.0      2.5    2.5  No 
Turkey   9.0–19.0      6.0    6.0  BM 
Memo:        
United States    3.0–12.0    0.0–10.0   0.0–10.0   0.0–10.0  No 
Japan   0.125–2.5    0.05–1.3   0.05–1.3   0.05–1.3  No 
Euro area        0.0–2.0    0.0–2.0  No 
United Kingdom      0.4    0.0    0.0  No 
MR = Market rate. BM = Below market rate. 
Note: Data for 1998 refer to Table 2 in Kamin et al (1998). Reserve requirements vary for some countries 
depending on the nature of the liabilities. 
Source: National data (questionnaire). 







  1990 1998 2000 2006 
Latin America         
Mexico   30.0   0.0   0.0   0.0 
Peru       8.0   8.0 
Asia         
India   38.5   25.0   25.0   25.0 
Indonesia   4.5     11.6   19.4 
Malaysia   10.0–17.0   17.0   3.0–7.0   3.0–7.0 
Philippines       30.0   30.0 
Singapore   18.0   18.0   8.0   18.0 
Thailand   5.0   6.0   5.0   5.0 
Other emerging 
economies 
       
Saudi Arabia   20.0   20.0   20.0   20.0 
South Africa   5.0–20.0     5.0   5.0 
Turkey       8.0–14.0   
Note: Data for 1998 refer to Table 2 in Kamin et al (1998). 
Source: National data (questionnaire). 





Structural bank indicators 
Non-performing 
loans
1  Capital asset ratio
2 Operating costs
3  Return on assets
4
 
2000 2005 2000 2005 2000 2005 2000 2005 
Latin America          
Argentina   16.0    5.2    10.6      4.6    4.6    0.0    0.9 
Brazil   8.3   4.4    13.8    17.4   6.9   5.8   1.1   2.1 
Chile   1.7   0.9    13.3    13.0   3.0   3.0   1.0   1.3 
Colombia   11.0    2.7    13.2    13.5    11.0    5.3      2.8 
Mexico   5.8   1.8    13.8    14.3   5.6   4.7   0.9   2.4 
Peru     2.1    12.9    12.0    5.3    4.7    0.3    2.2 
Venezuela   6.6   1.2      15.5   8.7   6.2   2.8   3.7 
Asia          
China   22.4   10.5        1.4    1.1    0.1    0.8 
Hong Kong SAR     7.3    1.5    17.8    14.9    1.2    1.0      1.7 
India   12.8    5.2    11.1    12.8   2.6   2.4   0.7   0.9 
Indonesia   34.4   15.6   21.6   19.6   2.5   3.6   0.3   1.7 
Korea   8.9   1.2    10.5    12.8   1.8   1.7    –0.6   1.2 
Malaysia   15.4    9.9    12.5    13.1    1.6    1.5    1.4    1.3 
Philippines   24.0   20.0   16.2   18.1   3.4   3.4   0.4   1.1 
Singapore   3.4   3.8    19.6    15.8   2.4   1.0   1.3   1.2 
Thailand   17.7   11.1   11.3   13.3    1.9    2.0   –0.2    1.5 
Central Europe          
Czech Republic    29.3    4.3    17.4   11.9    3.3    2.1    0.7    1.4 
Hungary   3.0   2.1    13.7    12.0   4.9   3.6   1.3   2.0 
Poland   15.5    7.7    12.9    14.5    4.8    3.7    1.1    1.6 
Other emerging 
economies 
        
Israel   6.9    10.3    9.2    10.9   2.4   2.5   0.5   0.8 
Russia   7.7   3.2    19.0    16.0   6.3   3.8   0.9   3.2 
Saudi  Arabia   10.4   10.6   21.0   17.1    1.6    1.6    2.0    3.5 
South Africa      1.5    14.5   12.3    4.9    3.1      1.1 
Turkey   9.2   4.8    17.3    24.2   5.7   6.0     1.7 
Memo:          
United  States   1.1   0.7    12.4   13.0    2.9    2.3    1.1    1.3 
Germany   4.7   4.8    11.7    13.4   1.5   1.2   0.2   0.2 
Japan   5.3   1.8    11.7     1.2   1.1   0.0   0.5 
1  As a percentage of total loans.    
2  As a percentage of risk-weighted assets.    
3  As a percentage of total 
assets.    
4  In per cent. 
Sources: IMF, Global Financial Stability Report; Bankscope; BIS calculations. 





Average daily money market turnover 






swaps  Others 
 
2000  2005  2000  2005  2000  2005  2000  2005 
Latin America                 
Argentina         0.1       0.6
1   0.2
1 
Chile     0.2             0.2
2 
Colombia   1.2   2.4   0.6   0.9       0.6
3   1.6 
Mexico   7.3   5.9           0.0
4   1.7
5 
Peru   0.3   0.3   0.3   0.3         
Venezuela   0.7   0.6   0.7   0.6         
Asia                 
China   15.6   62.2   10.6   41.9         
Hong Kong SAR   7.0   8.0       3.8   4.1     
India   2.4   2.6   0.0   0.9   0.1   0.1   2.4   1.6 
Indonesia   0.2   0.4             
Korea           2.5   3.5   0.2
6   0.2
6 
Malaysia
7   0.2   0.1   ...   0.1   1.6   2.4   …
8
   … 
8
 
Philippines   0.5   0.3         0.0     
Singapore                 
Thailand   1.4   2.1   0.0   0.0       1.4
9   2.1
9 
Central Europe                 
Czech Republic   1.9   1.6   0.0   0.0         
Hungary   0.8   3.8   0.0   0.2 
     0.8
10   3.5
11 
Poland
     5.1     0.2     0.9     4.0 
Other emerging 
economies 
               
Israel   0.2   0.3             
Saudi Arabia       0.6   0.8         
Turkey   2.2   2.8   2.0 
12   1.9
12       0.2
13   0.9
13 
Note: Money turnover data include various instruments that are not uniformly classified across countries. In 
some countries they include the central bank’s own repo (and reverse repo) transactions with counterparties. 
1    Call market (interbank loans).    
2    Interbank short-term loans.    
3    Includes repo and buy/sell-backs.   
4    Includes reverse repos.    
5    Mexican Derivatives Exchange. Daily average volume for TIIE (Interbank 
Interest Rate) 28-day futures contracts traded in Mexder.    
6  Monetary Stabilization Bonds issued by the Bank 
of Korea.    
7  “…” denotes negligible.    
8  Includes negotiable certificates of deposit and bankers’ acceptances.  
9    BOT Repo, interbank deposits and FX swaps.    
10    FX swaps: 0.1 and unsecured market: 0.7.     
11    FX  swaps: 2.9 and unsecured market: 0.6.    
12    Data cover the transactions of banks, intermediary 
institutions and the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) in the Istanbul Stock Exchange Repo 
Market and open market operations and repo transactions at the CBRT.    
13  Interbank repo transactions in the 
money market at the CBRT. 
Source: National data (questionnaire). 





Depth of government bond market 
Outstanding 
stocks 




(“on the run” 
bonds; in bp) 









2000  2005  2000  2005  2000  2005  2000  2005 
Latin America                 
Argentina   35   50             
Chile   36   25     3.0–5.0   0.8
1   1.1   3.3   3.1 
Colombia   14   25   15.0
2  10.0
2  0.6   15.0   3.5   3.8 
Mexico   10   13   14.0   5.0     5.2   1.5   3.2 
Peru     4    30.0     1.3     12.0 
Venezuela   7.3   9.8   28.0   52.0       2.5   3.7 
Asia                 
China   9  15       4.7   40.2     
Hong Kong SAR   8  9      52.6   55.2     
India   19   26   1.0–3.0   1.0–2.0       12.6
3   14.1
3 
Indonesia   31   15       0.1   0.7     
Korea   2  11       8.6   9.2   3.5   5.9 
Malaysia   71   80   2.0   4.0   1.4   0.9   5.1   5.1 
Philippines   31
4   39
4     17.3   0.1   0.0     
Singapore   77
5   103
5 
 …6  S$0.1–0.2
7  …6   15.0   4.1
8   5.7
8 
Thailand   15   22   2.0–5.0   2.0–5.0       6.7   9.9 
Central Europe                 
Czech Republic   5  16   9.0
9  7.0
9  2.2   1.0   4.1
10   7.9 
Hungary
11   31   40    5.0–18.0   5.0   3.2   1.6   3.6 
Poland
12   17   31   9.0   2.5   10.5   36.8   3.9   5.8 
Other emerging 
economies 
               
Israel   31   45       0.5   1.1     
Saudi Arabia   104   59  10.0–15.0   10.0   0.0   0.0   7  5 
Turkey   29
13   50     20.0   19.7
14   9.4   1.3   3.2 
1  Refers to 2001.    
2  Denominated in domestic currency.    
3  New loans issued during the year.    
4  Central 
government local currency issuances.    
5  Includes marketable and non-marketable securities.    
6  Trading of 
marketable securities not active.    
7  The market convention in terms of prices.    
8  Marketable securities only.  
9  Excluding bonds with shorter times to maturity than one year.    
10  Average residual maturity weighted with 
the annual turnover. Maturity of each bond is median maturity of the year.   
11    Data for local currency 
denominated marketable government securities.    
12  Market bonds and bills together.    
13  Total of cash and 
non-cash stocks.    
14  Daily transaction volumes in the Bonds and Bills Market in the Istanbul Stock Exchange. 





Sources of financing for the private non-financial sector 




institutions  Foreign sources Others 
 
1993  2005  1993  2005  1993  2005  1993  2005 
Latin America                 
Argentina     54.0             46.0
1 
Chile     22.6             77.4
1 
Colombia     25.0         23.0     52.0
1 
Mexico   91.5   36.9   8.5   31.6     24.4     7.1
2 
Peru     67.0     20.0
3     12.0     1.0
4 
Asia                 
India
5   21.7   51.7   34.4   16.6   4.6   2.2   39.3   29.5
6 
Indonesia     13.3     10.0     37.0     39.7
1 
Korea   24.5   32.1
7   35.0   23.5   3.7   7.2   36.8   37.3 
Malaysia   54.9   38.9   45.1   3.7     22.5     34.9
1 
Philippines                 
Singapore   87.2   75.2
8   12.8   9.2
9         15.6
2 
Thailand   84.1   58.4     0.3   7.5   16.8   1.0   24.5 
Central Europe                 
Czech Republic
10     13.8
11     3.2     5.2     77.8
1 
Hungary   22.5   12.2
12   0.3   1.5
12   49.2   37.2
13   28.0   49.0
1 
Poland
14     13.4         1.1     85.5 
Other emerging 
economies                 
Israel   51.6   61.0     18.0   6.6   18.0   41.8   3.0
2 
Turkey     75.6     3.3
15     21.1     
Memo:                 
Japan   42.7   63.5   27.9   17.3   0.0   0.0   18.0   19.1 
United States   25.8   20.6   26.9   27.0   2.9   5.7   44.5   46.8 
Note: Data for 1993 refer to Table 5 in Kamin et al (1998). 
1    Includes equity.    
2    Equity excluded.    
3    Mainly pension and mutual funds.    
4  Other  residents.   
5    Financial year 2004–05.    
6    Includes non-bank borrowings, trade dues and other current liabilities.    
7  Commercial banks and specialised banks.    
8  Includes domestic banking units and Asian Currency Units of 
commercial banks.    
9  Includes finance companies and merchant banks.    
10  Data cover loans to NFCs and 
HHs.    
11  Commercial banks, money market funds and credit unions.    
12  Credit.    
13  Credit and equity.   
14  Operating activity, excluding investment.    
14  Equity included in 1993.    
15  Investment and Development 
Banks. 
Sources: Central banks; IMF; national data (questionnaire); BIS. 





Composition of commercial bank credit 
As a percentage of total credit 
Home mortgage  Consumer credit  Enterprise credit 
 
1993 2000 2005 1993 2000 2005 1993 2000 2005 
Latin America           
Argentina       5.9    4.3     33.3  26.4     37.8   39.8 
Chile
1   11.2    16.8    20.6    4.0    8.0 12.2   44.5   68.3   65.1 
Colombia       32.8   10.7     14.4  26.1     41.2    5.3 
Mexico    13.0    26.7   18.4    7.2   5.9  27.8   36.3   60.9    43.0 
Peru     7.0    13.0      9.0  13.0      68.0    62.0 
Venezuela     3.0    0.0     12.0  10.0     51.0   56.0 
Asia           
China           3.8  10.5      96.0    89.5 
Hong Kong SAR    9.4    33.7   31.4    3.6   7.1    8.3   87.0   59.2    60.3 
India
2     2.5    6.8      4.5    6.9    56.5    55.3    47.9 
Indonesia   4.1    5.9    8.1    6.9   14.9  29.9   70.7   63.1    48.7 
Korea
3   12.7        11.7    31.5
4   48.9
4   74.5    63.0    48.8 
Malaysia
5   13.9    15.7    27.7    11.2    12.4 26.1   30.1   61.6   40.9 
Philippines
6     1.7    1.6      1.8    4.1      91.2    84.1 
Singapore   14.9    25.0    33.8      16.0  16.4      58.9    49.8 
Thailand
7   8.3    7.9    11.0    4.1    3.3   7.0   58.8   62.5   61.4 
Central Europe           
Czech Republic      8.6
8,9  18.5
9     5.3
8   8.9      41.7    42.5 
Hungary     6.2    4.3   23.0    3.5   8.4  14.4   52.4   86.0    60.0 
Poland
10       11.1      21.7  19.5      57.9    43.5 
Other emerging 
economies 
         
Israel     11.0    14.0      7.0    8.0      74.0    66.0 
Saudi Arabia            14.3  39.9     78.0   52.8 
South Africa       33.9   46.4     9.2 10.7     28.6   24.5 
Turkey            13.7  17.3     50.4   32.2 
Memo:           
United States   17.4    19.2   24.6   14.9   13.5  12.6   40.2   47.0    44.2 
Japan   8.0    13.7    20.6    3.5   2.4    2.1    80.2    63.2    47.4 
Note: Data for 1993 refer to Table 14 in Kamin et al (1998). 
1  Interbank loans excluded.    
2  End of March of the respective year.    
3  Interbank loans excluded. They 
represent 1.6% in 2000 and 0.8% in 2005.    
4  Total loans to the HH sector.    
5  The residual categories are 
loans to financial institutions, foreign entities and other domestic entities.    
6  Accounts lodged under foreign 
offices excluded.    
7  Other household credit: 14.5% in 2000; 10.3% in 2005.    
8  Refers to 2002.    
9  Includes 
mortgages and loans from building societies.    
10  Annual average; government securities and securities issued 
by other sectors held by commercial banks are excluded. 
Sources: US Flow of Funds; BoJ Flow of Funds; national data (questionnaire). 





Structure of household balance sheet 
Household debt as a 
percentage of household 
disposable income 
Household debt as a 
percentage of household 
assets   
1995 2000 2005 1995 2000 2005 
Latin America             
Chile     34.0   56.0       
Colombia   27.6   25.7   23.7       
Mexico   17.3   10.5   14.9
1     18.3
2   18.7
2 
Peru     17.0   12.0       
Asia             
China   0.9  5.2    4.0   27.3   10.4 
India         2.5
3     2.8
3 
Korea   85.1   93.9   139.6   46.0   41.2   52.9 
Philippines   3.5
4   2.8  4.1      
Singapore     218.1   218.7     20.2   19.5 
Thailand   46.9
5,6  46.7
5   59.3
5       
Central Europe             
Czech Republic   11.9
7   14.1   25.3
1   3.6
7   4.1   7.5
1 
Hungary   6.4  7.0  28.9   8.4   7.1   26.0 
Poland
8   7.0
6   13.5   21.1   20.1
6   27.0   34.7 
Other emerging economies             
Algeria             
Israel   70.0   76.0   64.0   20.4   17.4   15.6 
South Africa   58.3   53.3   62.4   20.6   18.2   18.8 
Turkey   1.2  5.5  9.3      
Memo:             
United States   93.5   102.8   135.1   15.5   15.2   19.1 
Japan   130.2   131.0   127.9   15.0   14.6   14.7 
Euro area   70.9   83.0   89.2   11.8   12.4   12.3 
1  Refers to 2004.    
2  Refers to households’ financial assets: M2 and equity holdings. Without equity holdings 
the ratios are 31.2% in 2000 and 34.1% in 2005.    
3  Refers to urban HHs. For rural HHs: 1.8% and 2.8%. Data 
pertain to 1991–92 and 2002–03.    
4  Refers to 1999.    
5  HH debt as a percentage of HH income.    
6  Refers 
to 1996.    
7  Refers to 1998.    
8  Refers to HH debt (without interest) to financial institutions and HH assets 
(currency in circulation, gross deposits (without interest), assets outside banking system). 
Sources: OECD; US Flow of Funds; national data (questionnaire). 





Gross flow of financial liabilities of the personal sector 
In percentages 
Composition of outstanding financial liabilities Annual flow of gross 
financial liabilities as 
a percentage of GDP  Mortgage debt  Other debt   
1995–97  2003–05  1995–97  2003–05  1995–97  2003–05 
Latin America             
Chile     17.5
1     54.3     45.7 
Colombia   5.0   1.1   49.1   25.7   50.9   74.3 
Mexico   2.8   1.7   87.9   74.6   12.1   25.4 
Peru   0.3   1.5   2.5   14.0   97.5   86.0 
Asia             
Indonesia   20.9   9.9         
Korea   8.5   4.8         
Malaysia
2   16.3   13.4   36.0   48.2   64.0   51.9 
Singapore     2.0     73.5     26.5 
Thailand
3   3.0   2.1   34.6   53.4   65.4   46.6 
Central Europe             
Czech Republic
4   2.5   4.2   3.0   13.5   97.0   86.5 
Hungary
5   0.5   5.3   56.0
6   38.0
6   44.0   62.0 
Poland   1.3
7   1.6     28.7     71.3 
Other emerging 
economies 
           
South Africa   8.6   6.9   36.7   58.0   63.3   42.0 
Turkey
5,8   2.2   6.6       100.0   100.0 
Memo:             
United States   6.0   11.9   64.2   67.9   35.8   32.2 
1  As a percentage of disposable private income.    
2  Refers to 1997.    
3  Liabilities with commercial banks.   
4  1997 and 2004.    
5  Household sector.    
6  Housing loans.    
7  Refers to 1997.    
8  Consumer credits, credit 
card claims and credit to personnel. 
Sources: US Flow of Funds; national data (questionnaire); BIS. 





Structure of the mortgage loan market 
Percentage share in 
total outstanding 
mortgage loans  



















Latin America               
Argentina        Yes      Limited 
Chile       No
1  No   No
2   No  Limited 
Colombia           Yes   Yes
3  Limited 
Mexico   41.0
4   59.0
5    Yes   Yes   Yes
6  Limited 
Peru        Yes   No    Limited 
Venezuela   0.0   100.0    22.0   78.0    No 
Asia               
Hong Kong SAR   0.3   99.7    Yes      Yes
7 
India 
 8   8          Yes   
Indonesia  1st year  2nd year  Yes        No 
Korea             Yes
9   
Malaysia   23.4   76.6    Yes   Yes
10    Limited 
Philippines
11     100.0   Yes  Yes   Yes    Limited 
Singapore        Yes     Yes
12  Limited 
Thailand    Majority    Yes      No 
Central Europe               
Czech Republic  Majority           Yes
13   
Poland   1.8   98.2    Yes     Yes
14  Very 
limited 
Other emerging 
economies               
Israel    68.0   32.0   Yes  Yes   No    No 
Saudi Arabia              No 
South Africa    Majority    Majority
15     Yes
16 
1  Positive correlation between both variables, but they are not linked.    
2  Ceiling interest rate, but not binding.   
3  93% of mortgage loans are indexed to inflation (UVR). However, recently half of the new disbursements have 
been made at a fixed rate.    
4  Mortgage loans originated by banks and sofoles.    
5  Credits originated by 
public sector government agency indexed to inflation.    
6  Negotiated with customers.    
7  Exists but limited 
usage.    
8  Interest rates on housing loans are deregulated and decided by the banks. Borrowers have the 
option of both fixed and variable rate loans.    
9  Linked to market interest rates (CD, etc.).    
10  Ceiling rate on 
housing loans extended to low-income groups under the Lending Guidelines to Priority Sectors.    
11  Local 
commercial bank.    
12  S$ interbank rates.    
13  Mostly 5Y.    
14  Also negotiated with customers.    
15  Mostly 
linked to prime lending rate which is in turn linked to policy rate.    
16  Started in 1989 and accelerated in 2002. 
Source: National data (questionnaire). 





Annual gross flow of financial liabilities  
of the non-financial corporate sector 
As a percentage of GDP 
 
1982–84 1995–97  2003–05 
Latin America      
Argentina     6.6    6.6 
Chile   11.6      11.2 
Colombia     10.7    22.4
1   5.8
2 
Asia      
China     19.4    19.1 
Korea   21.8    25.2    10.4 
Malaysia     46.1    7.8 
Singapore   9.6    59.6    14.9
2 
Thailand       4.0    21.0 
Central Europe      
Czech Republic
2,3    22.7    8.2 
Hungary       26.8    18.6 
Other emerging 
economies      
South Africa       9.1    5.5 
Turkey       16.8    12.0 
Note: Data for 1982–84 refer to Table 9 in Kamin et al (1998). 
1  Refers to 1997.    
2  Refers to 2003–04.    
3  Refers to 1996–97. 
Source: National data (questionnaire). 





Structure of outstanding bank deposits and loans 
As a percentage of total 
Deposits Loans 


















Latin America             
Argentina   94.4   5.6     ...   ...   
Chile   99.4   0.6   13.0  74.0   26.0  17.0
1 
Colombia   …   …   2.1   42.0   58.0  4.5 
Mexico   94.9   5.1   1.1       
Peru   48.0
2   52.0   4.2       
Venezuela   13.0   87.0   1.0   0.0   100.0
3  60%<12.0 
Asia             
India  Majority
     2.0      4.4 
Indonesia   50.2   49.8     0.7   99.3  – 
Korea       
 4   4   
Malaysia   48.7   51.3     40.9   59.1  … 
Philippines   36.4
5     3.5
5   93.2    15.5 
Singapore
6   70.7   29.3   6.0      36.0–60.0 
Thailand  Majority     8.4
7   20.0   80.0  75.6
8 
Central Europe             






















Hungary   54.0   46.0   3.0     15.0   85.0  15.0 
Poland
11   55.0   45.0   3.2
12   12.0
13   88.0  84.2
2 
Other emerging 
economies             
Israel       14.2     15.2 
Saudi Arabia
15   46.8   9.4  Short-term      … 
South Africa   23.0   77.0   0.0–1.0  Minority  Majority  24.0–240.0
Turkey   99.9   0.1   2.8   78.3   21.7  ... 
1  Estimated.    
2  Term deposits.    
3  In Venezuela the CB regulates interest rates for loans to a top rate of 28% 
per year. Loans can have variable rates below that.    
4  Corporations: 46.1% at fixed rate; 53.9% at variable 
rate; households: 13.8% at fixed rate; 86.2% at variable rate.    
5  Time deposits.    
6  Deposits refer to non-
bank customers’ deposits; loans refer to non-bank loans and advances including bills discounted/purchased.   
7  Excluding current and saving deposits (41% of total deposits).    
8  Excluding call loans (11% of total loans).   
9  Specially housing loans.    
10  57% of loans to private sector.    
11  Information on deposits is unavailable; 
figures reflect the interest rate structure of the sum of all interest bearing liabilities.    
12  Of liabilities to non-
financial sector.    
13  Share in total loans to financial sector (excluding banks), non-financial sector, general 
government sector.    
14  Of loans to non-financial sector.    
15  Non-interest bearing deposits are excluded. 
Source: National data (questionnaire). 





Currency denomination of bank balance sheets 
Percentage denominated in foreign currency 
Assets Liabilities 
 
1993 2000 2005  1993  2000  2005 
Latin America             
Argentina     69.8   20.6     69.1   17.6 
Chile   19.7   14.4   18.9   20.6   12.9   17.8 
Colombia   13.0   8.1   6.5   11.1   10.0   5.4 
Mexico   26.7   16.1   9.8   28.2   15.6   9.8 
Peru     74.0   66.0     76.0
1   66.0
1 
Venezuela   12.2   8.1   5.7   3.5   2.2   1.2 
Asia             
Hong Kong SAR   74.5   57.8   58.0   75.5   54.3   54.5 
India     2.9   1.1     5.0   4.3 
Indonesia   35.1   25.1   19.6   36.4   30.3   19.3 
Korea   4.1   13.4   9.9   3.9   12.2   9.9 
Malaysia     6.2   6.4     4.2   7.5 
Philippines     32.4   31.0     40.8   37.8 
Singapore     75.4
2   74.6
2     75.1
3   73.3
3 
Thailand     14.0   11.8     6.8   5.4 
Central Europe             
Czech Republic     18.6   18.5     17.1   14.7 
Hungary   28.8   35.6   38.4   30.9   35.9   31.6 
Poland
4     21.0   23.3     18.0   16.2 
Other emerging economies             
Israel   36.1   39.0   42.0   36.9   38.0   43.0 
Saudi Arabia   25.6   34.5   19.3   29.1   31   22.8 
South Africa     6.8   8.7     3.1   2.0 
Turkey
5     35.0   32.0     46.0   36.0 
Memo:             
United States   1.2   0.7   0.8   1.5   0.8   0.7 
Japan   11.6   12.7   21.3   14.3   9.1   12.9 
1  Excludes capital.    
2  Refers to Asian Currency Unit (ACU) assets and foreign notes and coins, net amount 
due from banks, NCDs held, loans to non-bank customers and bills discounted/purchased in the Domestic 
Banking Unit (DBU); items that do not have breakdowns by S$ and FC in the DBU are excluded.    
3  Refers to 
ACU liabilities and non-bank deposits, NCDs issued, amount due to banks, bills payable in DBU. Items in the 
DBU that do not have breakdowns by S$ and FC are excluded.    
4  Annual average.    
5  Year-end figures. 
Sources: IMF; national data (questionnaire); BIS statistics. 
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